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Abstract
This thesis is comprised of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examine
a voting model where two political parties have fixed positions on a uni-
dimensional policy space but where the implemented policy is the convex
combination of the two positions and study the effects of opinion polls on
election results and social welfare. Voters are completely agnostic about
the distribution of preferences and gain sequential and partial information
through series of opinion polls. Voters’ behavior is driven in part by regret
minimization. The mass of undecided voters decreases monotonically with
the number of polls, but may not necessarily disappear. Voters who remain
undecided have centrist ideologies. Finally, social welfare is not necessarily
increasing in the number of polls: having more polls is not always better.
Features of the model are confirmed by empirical evidence.
In the second chapter, which is a joint work with Agustin Casas and
Guillermo Diaz, we evaluate the effect of an institutional provision designed
to increase accountability of local officials, and we show that its implemen-
tation can lead to a distribution of power within the legislature which is not
consistent with voters’ true preferences. The cause of this inconsistency is
the ballot design which asymmetrically affects the officials listed on it. We
analyze the case of the Lima’s 2013 city legislature recall referendum and
show that the design of the referendum ballot had adverse and significant
effects on the composition of the Lima’s city legislature. We also show that
the election results with more “neutral” ballot designs would have been sig-
nificantly different, and the composition of the legislature would have been
more representative of voters’ true preferences. More specifically, we use our
results to simulate the outcome of the election with a random order of can-
didates. Even though the voters’ fatigue is still present, it affects all parties
equally, obtaining a more faithful representation of the voters’ preferences.
Finally, the third chapter is a joint work with Marco Serena. For small
electorates, the probability of casting the pivotal vote drives one’s willingness
to vote, however the existence of costs of voting incentivizes ones abstention.
4
In two-alternative pivotal-voter models, this trade-off has been extensively
studied under private information on the cost of voting. We complement the
literature by providing an analysis under complete information, extending
the analysis of Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting.
Public Choice. 41, 7-53]. If the cost of voting is sufficiently high at least
for supporters of one of the two alternatives, the equilibrium is unique,
and fully characterized. If instead the cost of voting is sufficiently low for
everyone, we characterize three classes of equilibria and we find that all
equilibria must belong to one of these three classes, regardless of the number
of individuals. Furthermore we focus on equilibria which are continuous in
the cost of voting. We show that this equilibrium refinement pins down a
unique equilibrium. We conclude by discussing an application of our findings
to redistribution of wealth.
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Chapter 1
Polling in a Proportional
Representation System
The effects that opinion polls have on the electorate have been studied ex-
tensively. The conclusion of the literature is that the publication of polls
influences how the electorate votes (Myerson and Weber, 1993; Morton et al,
2015). In many countries this is reflected on past or present restrictions on
how, when and if a poll should be published. The restrictions can range
from a ban on publishing polls for a specific time before the elections, like
in Italy (fifteen days1) or in Greece (fifteen days until 2014, one day since2),
to an outright ban during the entire campaign period like in Singapore.3 In
the last decade various organizations and watchdogs have been publishing
reports on these restrictions (Article19 (2003) and Spangenberg (2003)) and
at the same time in many countries there have been public discussions on
whether restrictions should be posed or lifted. In India in 2004 the main
parties argued that announcing exit poll results while the elections are still
going should be banned as they believed this favored certain parties4 and
in 2012 India’s Chief Election Commissioner stated that opinion polls and
exit polls should both be banned.5 A 2013 survey in the United Kingdom,
1Legge 22 Febbraio 2000, n. 28, “Disposizioni per la parita` di accesso ai mezzi di
informazione durante le campagne elettorali e referendarie e per la comunicazione politica”,
article 8.
2Law 4315/2014, article 32.
3Parliamentary Elections Act, Chapter 218, article 78C.
4Concern over India opinion polls (April 6, 2004). BBC News. Retrieved from: http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3603741.stm
5Opinion, exit polls have no scientific basis: CEC (April 28,
2012). IBNLive. Retrieved from: http://ibnlive.in.com/news/
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where there is not a ban on publishing polling results before elections in
place, showed that three out of ten MPs supported the idea of such a ban.6
These restrictions and discussions show that the issue of the interaction
between opinion polls and elections is important by both a theoretical and
practical point of view. The motive behind such bans is usually to let the
electorate vote “trully” without the influence of the results of opinion polls,
an influence which is perceived as bad. The fear that polls may be biased,
in which case the electorate might base its decision on false information,
is one argument used to argue in favor of restrictions. Another argument
is that basing the decision itself on the information generated by polling
might distort the election results away from the “true” preferences of the
electorate.7 Opinion polls are useful inasmuch as they clear some uncertainty
in the political environment leading to more efficient decision making from
the side of the political actors. Examples of uncertainty include uncertainty
about valence of the candidates as e.g. in Kendall et al (2015) or on the
actual policy-ideology of candidates as in Baron (1994).
In modern parliamentary democracies where parties compete for par-
liament seats, these seats can be seen as a measure of political power; a
ruling party that controls enough seats to just secure a majority will have
to be much more moderate in its policies compared to a party that controls
a larger fraction of the parliament. For this reason a moderate voter may
choose to not vote for his favorite party if he feels that it may be too strong.
Therefore a moderate voter who is happier with a more equal split of parlia-
mentary seats would like to know how the rest of the voters will vote before
he decides his own vote, implying that he would need to have some informa-
tion about the distribution of the rest of the voters. This idea is analyzed by
Ceci and Kain (1982) who using an experiment show that moderate voters,
when instructed that the latest poll showed that a candidate “commanded
a substantial lead over the other”, tend to report that they would vote for
the trailing one.
An interesting real life example that shows that parties understand and
can try to exploit the motives of moderate voters comes from the Greek
opinion-exit-polls-have-no-scientific-basis-cec/252787-3.html
6Eaton, David. Should pre-election opinion polls be banned?
A third of MPs think so (November 13, 2013). NewStatesman.
Retrieved from: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/
should-pre-election-opinion-polls-be-banned-third-mps-think-so
7Morton et al (2015) identification strategy exploits a 2005 French voting reform that
came into place precisely to a avoid the situations where exit polls were public before some
voters went to vote.
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general elections of January 2015. The campaigning period of these elections
was very short, and during this period it was made clear that the anti-
austerity and left-wing Syriza party would win the elections, since it was
systematically ahead in the polls. The real question was whether Syriza
would be able to form a government on its own, meaning whether it would be
able to secure at least 151 out of the 300 seats in the Greek parliament. From
the parties expected to enter the parliament, the anti-austerity small right-
wing party Anel was the one that Syriza would be most likely to cooperate
with, on an anti-austerity basis. Anel themselves had made it clear that
they would be willing to cooperate long before the elections were actually
called. The previous government was a coalition of two pro-austerity parties
the largest of which, the right-wing ND, was predicted to be in second
place in the elections. Anel political campaigning focused on the fact that
Syriza was going to win and the role Anel would play as a minority right-
wing counterbalance in a government that was almost certain going to be
dominated by the left. As such they targeted right-wing voters, who would
otherwise vote for ND, and moderate ones who could see Syriza as being
too radical, promising all their potential voters that they would control the
government from within.
An important assumption of the paper is that voters behavior is driven
by regret minimization. Regret can be defined as a painful emotional expe-
rience of feeling sorry of misfortunes or mistakes.8 It is obviously a common
human emotion, in fact, a study found it to be the second most frequently
named emotion (Shimanoff, 1984). Regret minimization can be expressed
concretely using the minimax regret decision rule (Savage, 1951) according
to which agents try to minimize the maximum regret their actions can incur.
This rule is particularly useful when an agent that has to make a decision
is aware of the set of potential future states of the world, but cannot assign
any probability to them.
The goal of this is paper to examine the effects in implemented policy
and welfare that public opinion polling has in a proportional representation
system, and under what conditions polls lead to complete information. To
do so, I construct a simple voting model in which a continuum of voters
8In her 1993 book “Regret: Persistence of the possible”, Janet Landman defines regret
as follows: “Regret is a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry
for misfortunes, limitations, losses, transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes. It is an
experience of felt-reason or reasoned- emotion. The regretted matters [...] may range from
the voluntary to the uncontrollable and accidental; they may be actually executed deeds or
entirely mental ones committed by oneself or by another person or group...” (as cited in
Li and Majumdar (2010)).
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has to choose between two parties with fixed positions in a proportional
representation system. Voters have imperfect information about each other’s
preferences and experience regret if they choose the wrong party. The voters
care about the shares of the two parties because the implemented policy is
a linear combination of the two parties’ fixed policies, using their shares
as weights. A voter’s information about other voters’ preferences can be
improved through a series of polls. I find the following. In the cases where
some voters have some sort of incomplete information the outcome may be
quite different compared to the outcome under complete information. The
voters most likely to report that they do not know what they will vote are
the more moderate ones.
The main result of the paper is that under some condition on the dis-
tribution function of the citizens’ preferences, a sequence of polls will be
able to reveal the complete information case. With every poll the undecided
mass weakly decreases, as more citizens are sure of what to vote. However,
there can be instances that after a number of polls the undecided mass stops
decreasing, and polls cannot provide the society with any more information.
Finally, the implemented policy and citizen welfare are both not monotonic
on the number of polls: the publication of one last additional poll before
the elections may result in an implemented policy that is further away from
the optimal policy or the policy that would be result under complete infor-
mation.
To the best of my knowledge this is the only paper that examines polls
and proportional representation together in a dynamic setting. It can also
explain the following empirical facts at the same time, namely, the correla-
tion between undecidedness and centrist ideologies, the non-monotonicity of
election results with respects to the number of opinion polls and the decrease
of the mass of undecided voters when more polls are published.
For simplicity the model of this paper only deals with two parties. How-
ever, the idea still holds to more than two parties.
1.1 Related Literature
Various works have examined how opinion polls affect voters and parties
through the information they reveal. Whenever there is some uncertainty,
an objective flow of information may help minimize it. Denter and Sisak
(2015) show that poll results affect campaigning spending which in turn af-
fect how voters vote. Bernhardt et al (2009), Morgan and Stocken (2008)
and Meirowitz (2005) show that polls are used to clear uncertainty over
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voters preferences, but at the same time this can give rise to strategic poll
answering on behalf of the voters. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) show
that polls create a “bandwagon” effect in favor of the leading party, while
Goeree and Großer (2006) and Taylor and Yildirim (2010) show that the
opposite “underdog” effect can appear, through the mobilization of the vot-
ers of the trailing party. In both of these papers it is argued that through
polls the “wrong” side may win which would result in a welfare loss. Klor
and Winter (2006) in an experiment show that in both close and lopsided
elections polls have a bandwagon effect, but the welfare effect of the polls
is ambiguous, and in a later paper (Klor and Winter, 2014) they use US
Gubernatorial elections data to show that the increase in participation in
elections is greater for the supporters of the leading candidate. Großer and
Schram (2010) find similar results. Herrmann (2014) examines polls under
proportional representation and shows that voters act strategically, trying
to anticipate the future coalitions after the elections take place.
The implemented policy as seen as a compromise among different ide-
ological sides, or power sharing, is not a new idea (Alesina and Rosenthal,
1996; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Llavador, 2006; De Sinopoli and Ian-
nantuoni, 2007; Saporiti, 2014; Matakos et al, 2015; Herrera et al, 2015).
Ortun˜o-Ort´ın (1997) discusses a two-party setting where implemented pol-
icy is a convex combination of the two parties’ platforms generated using
a continuous function of the parties’ shares in the elections. Sahuguet and
Persico (2006) point out that in a proportional system parties need to max-
imize their share (rather the probability of getting at least 50 per cent of
the vote) and that the implemented policy is, is at least partly influenced
by the minority party.
Various researchers have examined the idea of agents experiencing regret
from their actions and how regret affects their actions themselves. Savage
(1951) analyzes the minimax regret rule according to which agents try to
minimize the maximum regret their actions can incur. Similarly, Loomes
and Sugden (1982) argue that a theory of choice has to incorporate the
fact that agents do feel regret and that they take this into account in their
decision making. Zeelenberg (1999) provides a short overview of the issue
of rationality of regret and argues that acting on anticipated regret can be
rational, further pointing out that the minimax regret rule is useful when
there is no knowledge at all about the probabilities of the possible outcomes.
Most of the research on the application of regret in voting has focused on
the context of the paradox of voting. Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) point
out the difference between “risk” (voters are able to assign probabilities
to different states) and “uncertainty” (voters cannot assign probabilities to
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different states) and argue that rational behavior for a voter is not equivalent
to assuming the voter is expected utility maximizer. They furthermore show
that the minimax regret rule can give voter participation prediction results
that are more in line with empirical observations in the presence of a cost
of voting. In a later work (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975) they discuss the
reactions to their first paper and provide empirical evidence in favor of the
minimax regret rule over the expected utility maximization. Eager to test
the minimax regret hypothesis directly Kenney and Rice (1989) conducted
a survey which revealed that over one third of the participants could be
identified as minimax regret voters. In another survey of university students
Blais et al (1995) found that a third of the participants “strongly agreed”
and about forty percent “agreed” with a statement that identified minimax
regret voting, and that respondents that “strongly agreed” were significantly
more likely to have voted in the previous elections. However, this strong
relationship disappeared once they controlled for other variables such as
civic duty. In a later work Blais (2000) provided a more analytical critique
of Ferejohn and Fiorina. Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) conducted a survey
of Dutch voters which confirmed that regret is an emotion that voters can feel
after the elections. Recently there has been some renewed interest on regret
in voting. Li and Majumdar (2010) study voter turnout and incorporate
the concept of regret but not in the minimax way: how much regret a voter
experiences is inversely related to the margin of victory of his favorite party.
(Also see Degan and Li (2015)). Since most of the papers incorporating
regret in voting are concerned with the paradox of (not) voting, each voter’s
decision boils down to voting for his clearly preferred side, or abstaining. In
these models the action that can generate regret is abstaining which happens
when their failure to go and vote leads to a bad result for their favorite side.
In my model however, the action that generates regret is voting for the
wrong candidate.
Herrera et al (2015) in a proportional representation setting similar to
the one of this paper show that the “marginal voter’s curse” has the effect
that voters with low quality information abstain and not vote for fear of
casting a vote for the wrong side. Finally, voters may choose to support
the party that they are least ideologically close an idea which is shared by
the concept of the “protest vote”, by which voters may want to punish, or
control the power of their favorite party (see eg. Myatt (2015)).
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Figure 1.1: Polling for the 2015 Greek general elections
1.2 Empirical Evidence
I will use the Greek case to also briefly go over some empirical evidence
regarding the influence of the number of polls on the undecided vote and
winner’s share. After the previous parliament failed to elect a new head of
state constitutional provisions forced its dissolution. The announcement of
the elections took place on December 29 with the date set on January 25,
making the campaigning period a little more than three weeks long. There
were plenty of polls conducted by a number of public opinion polling orga-
nizations and companies. Most organizations had time to conduct four to
five polls before January 25. Figure 1.1 shows the percentages of undecided
voters reported by four polling organizations:9 GPO, ALCO, University of
Macedonia Public Polling Unit and Pulse in chronological order. The x-axis
in each of the graphs shows the number of polls conducted by each orga-
9The data was compiled from a number of news sources and the polling organizations
own reports.
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nization before the elections took place.10 Only polls conducted after the
elections were called are reported because at this moment the positions of
the parties must be thought as given. Furthermore, under the assumption
that respondents answered thoughtfully and given that the elections were
imminent, the answers are taken to represent the respondents’ true voting
behavior.
From the results presented here, with the exception of the University
of Macedonia results, “undecided” means any voter who when asked what
he would vote he did not give a party as an answer, or put it differently
he is classified as “undecided” if he answered any of the following: “I will
vote blank”, “I will abstain”, or “I don’t know/ I haven’t decided yet.” In
reporting their results for the parties and “undecided” shares, the University
of Macedonia first discarded those who indicated they would vote blank or
that they would abstain, therefore their “undecided” share includes only
those who specifically answered they had not decided yet. However they
do report what was the share of original answers that were blanks and
abstentions. Figure 1.2 shows the percentage of the undecided along with
the percentage of blanks and abstentions. All graphs tell the same story: the
percentage of the undecided voters, in any way we choose to define them,
goes down with every single poll as the date of the elections comes closer.
In Figure 1.3 in the left panel I plot the Syriza expected results of the
10Meaning that 1 signifies the last poll before the elections, 2 the second to last poll
before the elections and so on.
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Figure 1.3: Syriza predicted share
four polling organizations together. When more than one organizations
published results at the same day, I took the average of them. These results
show, that abstracting from random noise, there is no monotonic effect of
the number of polls on the predicted share of Syriza. This could imply
the absence of a pure bandwagon or underdog effect in these elections. At
the same time, in the right panel, I plot the difference between the same
Syriza shares depicted on the left one, and the ND (the second party in
the elections, leaving office) shares. The difference is positive, showing that
Syriza was always the frontrunner, but it was not monotonic in the number
of polls.
As mentioned in the introduction a finding of the model is that the
citizens who are more likely to abstain are mostly the voters who are ideo-
logically more moderate. In Appendix B, using the last wave of the World
Value Survey11 database I provide some evidence about that. The important
finding is that there is a positive relationship between being ideologically in
the center and being undecided. This positive relationship along with the
findings that more polls imply less undecided voters, and the non-monotonic
effect of polls on the share of the winning party and its difference from share
of its contender are all features that the theoretical model that is presented
next is able to accommodate.
11WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 6 2010-2014 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE
v.20141107. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate
File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid, SPAIN
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1.3 Model Description
There is a uni-dimensional policy instrument that can take values in D =
[−η, 1 + θ] ⊂ < with both η and θ positive. The voters have single-peaked
preferences over this policy space and their optimal policies are distributed
over D according to a distribution function F (·) which is assumed to be
continuous, strictly increasing and differentiable with a corresponding den-
sity function f(·). The utility of the voter xi from the implemented policy
x is given by the function −u(|x− xi|), ie. it is a function of the abso-
lute distance of the voter’s optimal policy xi from the implemented policy
x. Function −u(|x− xi|) is decreasing and concave in |x− xi| and it has a
unique maximum at x = xi such that u(0) = 0. These mean that the utility
function of a voter is symmetric around his optimal policy point where the
utility is maximum and normalized to zero. We will be identifying voters
with their optimal policy, ie., voter xi is the voter that has optimal policy
xi. There are two parties running in the elections, L and R each having a
fixed position at 0 and 1 respectively. The actual implemented policy, x,
will be the linear combination of the two policies using the parties’ shares
in the elections as weights:
x = pL × 0 + (1− pL)× 1 = 1− pL,
where pL is the share of votes party L gets. This share is defined as pL =
mL
mL+mR
, with mL and mR being the voter masses that voted for L and R
respectively, meaning that the parties’ shares are calculated over the mass
of voters that actually voted. If u is the mass of the citizens that decide
not to vote then mL +mR + u = 1. The setting is similar to Ortun˜o-Ort´ın
(1999).
Notice that pL =
mL
mL+mR
implies that the parties’ shares of influence
in the implemented policy are equal to their vote shares. Even though this
assumption is made for simplicity and clarity, all the results follow if we
instead assume the more flexible weight function
pˆL =
( mLmL+mR )
γ
( mLmL+mR )
γ + ( mRmL+mR )
γ
with γ ≥ 112 and finite (as in, for example, Saporiti (2014), Matakos et al
(2015)). Obviously, for γ = 1, pL = pˆL. As γ increases then the share of
the bigger party is getting bigger, and that of the smaller party smaller.
12The γ < 1 case is unrealistic as it would give the smaller party a greater share of seats
compared to its vote share.
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Table 1.1: Decision of a voter at 0.4
L share Implemented policy Decision
0.8 0.2 R
0.3 0.7 L
This captures the fact that some parliamentary systems, while mostly pro-
portional, give some bonus seats to the biggest party or demand a certain
percentage threshold to be passed before they assign seats to smaller parties.
Since increasing the votes cast for a party increases its number of seats
and its political power voters know that their votes will move the share of
a party up or down, and as a result, the implemented policy left or right.
If some voters expect the implemented policy to be, for example, too much
to their left they will want to vote for R. We can think of the voters each
deciding what vote to cast in order to bring the implemented policy as close
to them as possible in a similar way as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1996).
For this reason, each voter would like to know how the other voters are
behaving before he chooses which party to vote for. For example, even
though the voter might be ideologically closer to a party, if he expects too
many people to vote this party, he might want to vote for the other one.
Consider Table 1.1 where I analyze the decision of a voter located at 0.4.
This voter is closer to 0 than to 1, and as such he identifies with L more
than R. However, the decision of what to vote depends on what others will
do.
1.3.1 Regret Minimization
The second feature of voters’ behavior is regret minimization. In this setting
regret minimization is modeled using the minimax regret decision rule. If the
preference distribution is not known, some voters will need some additional
information before they decide which party to vote for. This information
will come in the form of polls. If however at the time of the election there
are still some undecided voters not sure of what they should vote, they will
vote according to the regret minimization criterion.
In this model, an undecided voter is a voter that cannot assign a proba-
bility to any of the following states of the world: i) the implemented policy
being to his left, ii) the implemented policy being to his right and iii) the
implemented policy being exactly on the voter’s optimal position.
When the time of the election comes the undecided voter will use the
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minimax regret rule to decide whether he will vote for L or for R. As it
will be made clear later, at any stage of the game, all voters know that the
implemented policy can never be to the left of some minimum or to the right
of some maximum implemented policy. Call them xL and xR respectively.
Voters in (xL, xR) cannot predict where exactly the implemented policy
will fall, because they do not know how the distribution of voters looks like.
Then, when the elections are held, given (xL, xR), they will use the minimax
regret rule.
Given the utility functions of the undecided voters, the greatest disutility
for each voter comes from when the implemented policy is at one of the two
corners of the interval (xL, xR). In particular, the greatest disutility for
voters in (xL,
xL+xR
2 ) comes from when the implemented policy is near xR,
and for voters in (xL+xR2 , xR) the greatest disutility comes from when the
implemented policy is near xL.
For the undecided voters, the maximum regret of voting L, comes from
when the implemented policy is too far to the left, near xL. This is because,
when the policy is too far to the left, all voters to the right of the policy
should vote R. Similarly, the maximum regret of voting R comes from when
the implemented policy is near xR. Therefore, for voters in (xL,
xL+xR
2 ) the
action that minimizes maximum regret is L and for the voters in (xL+xR2 , xR)
it is R.13
1.3.2 Complete information equilibrium
If the distribution function of the citizens’ optimal points F (·) were known
to them then the regret minimization criterion would have no bite: citizens
have all the available information they need in order to make the decision
of what to vote. In this case the only driving force behind voting would
be the optimal policies of the voters. In this complete information case
the set of pure strategies for a voter xi ∈ D is S = {L,R} with L and R
representing him voting for the left and right party respectively. Since the
implemented policy depends on the shares each party gets, voters strategies
are not independent from what the other voters will do. If a voter thinks
that the implemented policy will be too much on the left he may want to
vote for the right, and if he thinks the implemented policy will be too much
on the right he may want to vote for the left. A voter’s strategy is a function
σxi : S → [0, 1] that assigns a probability of voting for L given the position of
13Let me note at this point that the results I will derive in the following are robust to
using other decision criteria uncer uncertainty such as Wald’s or Hurwicz’s criterion.
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the voter. I define as x(σ) the implemented policy that results from strategy
profile σ = (σxi)xi∈D.
We are now ready to define the complete information voting equilibrium.
Definition 1. Strategy profile σ constitutes a Complete Information Voting
Equilibrium if:
• if xi < x(σ) then σxi = 1,
• if xi > x(σ) then σxi = 0,
• and if xi = x(σ) then σxi = 0.5.1415
The equilibrium defines a cut-off point x(σ) that divides the electorate in
two parts: one that vote for L that are to the left of it, and the one that vote
for R. The theorem that follows establishes the existence and uniqueness of
this cut-off.
Theorem 1. There always exists a unique Complete Information Voting
Equilibrium σ∗ characterized by the cut-off point x∗ = 1− F (x∗).
Proof. By continuity of F (·) the point x∗ exists, and by strict monotonicity
this point is unique. Now, let x∗ be the implemented policy. Then strategy
profile σ∗ implies that the voters who choose L are the ones to the left of
x∗ and the ones that choose R are those to the right of x∗, with masses
F (x∗) and 1− F (x∗) respectively. In turn, these masses give rise to the the
implemented policy x∗ = 1 × F (x∗) + 0 × (1 − F (x∗)) = 1 − F (x∗), which
proves that an equilibrium always exists, and since x∗ is unique there is only
one equilibrium defined by x∗ = 1− F (x∗).
The last step is to show that there is no other equilibrium. Suppose
that there is an equilibrium implemented policy x′ 6= x∗. The equilibrium
strategy implies that everybody to the left of x′ vote for L and the rest vote
for R, giving rise to the implemented policy x′′ = 1 − F (x′), but we have
that x′′ 6= x′, which leads to a contradiction.
Given their optimal policy points voters want to cast their vote in a
way that will bring the implemented policy as close to their optimal point
as possible, given the strategies of the other voters. There cannot be a
14In the the case of xi = x(σ), σxi = 0.5 is taken without loss of generality. In fact, any
σxi ∈ [0, 1] would work.
15This equilibrium can be easily shown to be the Strong Nash Equilibrium (Gerber and
Ortun˜o-Ort´ın (1998) and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın (1999)).
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situation in equilibrium where there exist some voters with optimal policy
to the left of x∗ who voted for R; if these voters would switch their vote,
the implemented policy would be closer to their optimal one. Note that the
equilibrium would be the same had we had expanded the strategy set to
include the possibility of abstention. Another interesting thing to notice is
that x∗ = 1 − F (x∗) does not necessarily correspond to the median voter
xM ; the model does not in general converge to the median voter. The only
case such that we have x∗ = xM is when xM = 1/2.16
1.3.3 Polls
When the distribution of voters is common knowledge, then the voters can
calculate x∗ = 1 − F (x∗) and infer what they should vote. However, when
the distribution is no longer known to the voters, we have incomplete in-
formation, and some voters do not have enough information to be certain
which party they need to vote for.
A voter will be certain of what to vote if the interval where the future
implemented policy will fall does not include his optimal policy. Therefore,
since the implemented policy x = 1 − pL can never fall outside of [0, 1], it
is easy to see that the voters to the left of 0 would never want to vote for
R. For all of them the state of the world for which xi < x happens with
probability one: they know for sure that the implemented policy will fall to
their right. By voting for L, pL increases and x comes closer to 0. Voting
R on the other hand, decreases pL and x gets closer to 1. Obviously out of
these two outcomes, it’s the first one that the voters in [−η, 0) prefer, so they
will vote for L. Similarly, voters to the right of 1 would vote for R. I will
call voters in [−η, 0) as left partizans and voters in (1, 1 + θ] right partizans.
When referring to both left and right partizans I will simply use partizans.
The rest of the voters, the ones in [0, 1], are the initially undecided voters
who would like some information from the polls to help them figure out what
to do.
An initially undecided voter knows that the future implemented policy
will be somewhere in [0,1] but he doesn’t know where exactly. It can fall to
the right of, to the left of or exactly on his optimal point, therefore it’s not
clear to him which party he should vote for. Consider again a voter with the
optimal point at 0.4. If this voter votes for L but the elections result in an
implemented policy of x = 0.1 then it would be clear to this voter that he
should have chosen R, since voting for L actually moved the implemented
16Since in this case we would have 1
2
= 1− F ( 1
2
), so F ( 1
2
) = 1
2
.
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policy away from his optimal point.
The voters do not know how many polls there will before the election.
The question asked in each poll is: “what will you vote in the elections?”.
A maintained assumption is that voters respond truthfully to polls which
I believe is a mild assumption, as it is not clear what a voter would gain
by lying. In this setting truthful responding means that the citizens are
honest when they answer the question: if they are sure that the implemented
policy will fall to their left they will respond R, if they are sure that the
implemented policy will fall to their right they will respond L. Otherwise
they will respond “I do not know.” The only information the citizens need
to answer in a poll or to vote in the elections is the information provided by
by the previous poll.17
Each poll can provide the undecided voters with two pieces of informa-
tion: the mass of the voters that will vote for party L, and the mass of the
undecided voters at the time of the poll. Using this information they can
calculate the two most extreme cases, the maximum possible implemented
policy which is defined as xR and the minimum possible one, defined as xL.
The way to find these two is to see what would be the implemented policy
if all the currently undecided would vote for L and what would it be if all
the undecided would vote for R.
Since the mass of the voters who have made up their mind consists of
the partisan voters and the formerly undecided that are now absolutely sure
of what to vote, this mass of voters forms a lower bound for the mass of
total voters the party will get in the future. Therefore an undecided voter
that reads the poll results and sees that the mass of voters that are going
to vote for party L is mL and the mass of the undecided is, say, u, can infer
a few other things. First, that the mass of voters that are going to vote for
party R is at least 1−mL−u. Second, that the vote share that party L can
get at this point is at most mL+umL+u+(1−mL−u) = mL+u and similarly that the
share of votes that R can get is at most 1−mL. Third, using mL + u and
1 −mL he can infer the potential implemented policies after each of these
two most extreme results: xL = 1−mL − u and xR = 1−mL.
A voter that is to the left of xL would never vote for party R. He knows
that the possible implemented policy cannot ever be closer to him than xL.
But since xL is already to his right he would never vote for R because this
way he would regret his decision with certainty. Therefore he votes for L.
Similarly every voter to the right of xR votes for party R. The voters that
17With the exception of the case where no poll took place. In this case, as it will be
shown later, the relevant information is given by the fixed positions of the parties.
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are located in [xL, xR] remain undecided. I will use [x
k
L, x
k
R] to indicate the
interval of the undecided voters after k polls, with x0L = 0 and x
0
R = 1. Note
also that
xkL ≥ xk−1L and xkR ≤ xk−1R ,∀k ∈ N. (1.1)
This means that once uncertainty has been cleared for some undecided voters
it never comes back. Furthermore, pkL is the percentage party L would get
if there were elections right after k polls.
After k polls, voters in [xkL, x
k
R] are called undecided at time k, voters in
[−η, xkL) are called L voters at time k, and voters in (xkR, 1 + θ] are called
R voters at time k. The voting equilibrium depends on how many polls
took place before the election. Therefore, for each number of polls, we have
a voting equilibrium which expresses how voters would have voted if there
were elections right after this number of polls.
Definition 2. After k polls strategy profile σk = (σkxi)xi∈D is a Voting
Equilibrium if:
• if x < xkL(σ)+xkR(σ)2 then σkx = L,
• otherwise σkx = R.
The two cut-off points xkL(σ) and x
k
R(σ) define the following regions of
voters. For x ≤ xkL(σ) we have the L voters who know for sure that the
implemented policy will be to their right; for x ≥ xkR(σ) we have the R
voters who know for sure that the implemented policy will be to their left;
and for x ∈ (xkL(σ), xkR(σ)) , we have the voters who vote according to the
minimax regret criterion.
Theorem 2. Under incomplete information and after k polls, there always
exists a unique equilibrium σk∗ characterized by the cut-off points x0L = 0
and x0R = 1 for k = 0, and x
k
L = 1 − F (xk−1R ) and xkR = 1 − F (xk−1L ) for
k > 0.
Proof. Consider the k > 0 case first. By continuity and strict monotonicity
of F (·) we have that xkL and xkR exist and are unique. Given xk−1L and xk−1R ,
citizens calculate xkL = 0 × F (xk−1R ) + 1 × (1 − F (xk−1R )) = 1 − F (xk−1R ),
the lowest point the implemented policy can be in the future. Similarly
they calculate xkR. Therefore, for x ∈ [−η, xkL] we have σkx = L, and for
x ∈ [xkR, 1 + θ] we have σkx = R. Finally, ∀x ∈ (xkL, x
k
R+x
k
R
2 ), the minimax
criterion implies that σkx = L and that ∀x ∈ (x
k
R+x
k
R
2 , x
k
R), the minimax
criterion implies that σkx = R. No voter has an incentive to deviate from
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this behavior. For k = 0 the argument is identical, with the difference that
x0L = 0 and x
0
R = 1 since with no polls conducted, the citizens know that
the implemented policy will have to fall into [0, 1].
Note that if xkL = x
k
R we are simply in the full information case. The
preceding theorem defines a sequence of voting equilibria, one for every k.
In the first poll, only the partizans declare their preference, the voters in
[0, 1] are undecided. When the first poll is published the masses of the
partizans are revealed, and with them an updated pair of minimum and
maximum possible implemented policies. In the second poll, the partizans
declare their preference but now also some of the undecided have made up
their mind. When the second poll is published the new voting masses are
declared and so on. This mechanism means that the xkL and x
k
R are governed
by the following system of equations:
xkL = 1− F (xk−1R ) (1.2)
xkR = 1− F (xk−1L ),
If after a number of polls s with each subsequent poll the interval of
the undecided does not change, then the process has reached a steady state
where xsL = x
s+t
L = x
∗
L and x
s
R = x
s+t
R = x
∗
R, t ≥ 1. Plugging the expression
for xk−1R into the expression for x
k
L we get:
xkL = 1− F (1− F (xk−2L )). (1.3)
This is a second order difference equation with initial values x0L = 0 and
x1L = 1− F (x0R) = 1− F (1).
Next, we will establish sufficient conditions for the sequence of polls to
result to the complete information outcome.
Theorem 3. If F ′(1 − F (x))F ′(x) < 1 ∀x ∈ [0, 1] then a sequence of polls
will lead to the complete information outcome.
The theorem will be proved through the following three propositions.
Proposition 1. The complete information outcome is a fixed point of func-
tion h(x) = 1− F (1− F (x)), x ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. This function is continuous as it is the composition of two continuous
functions, it is strictly increasing and its range is a proper subset of [0, 1]
therefore it has a fixed point in that subset. Suppose that time s is the first
time we observe xsL = x
s
R. Then the mass of undecided voters becomes 0, and
we have: xs+1L =
F (xsL)+0
F (xsL)+0+1−F (xsR) × 0 + (
1−F (xsr)
F (xsL)+0+1−F (xsR))× 1 = 1−F (x
s
R).
Similarly xs+1R = 1− F (xsR), showing that xs+1L = xs+1R . We also know that
xs+1L ≥ xsL and xs+1R ≤ xsR. Combining the two last inequalities together
we get that: xs+1L ≥ xsL = xsR ≥ xs+1R . But we have already shown that
xs+1L = x
s+1
R , therefore we have to have: x
s+1
L = x
s
L and x
s+1
R = x
s
R.
We have established existence of a fixed point of h(·), and we know that
one of the fixed points will always be the complete information outcome:
once it is reached all voters have made up their mind and are not going to
change it. Therefore, if h(·) has a unique fixed point, it will be the complete
information outcome. Uniqueness is not guaranteed however, and depends
on the form of the distribution function F (·).
Proposition 2. If F ′(1−F (x))F ′(x) < 1 ∀x ∈ [0, 1] then h(·) has a unique
fixed point.
Proof. Assume that there are two fixed points, x∗ and x∗∗ and that, without
loss of generality, x∗ < x∗∗, then by the Mean Value Theorem, there exists
a d ∈ (x∗, x∗∗) ⊂ (0, 1) such that
h′(d) =
h(x∗∗)− h(x∗)
x∗∗ − x∗ =
x∗∗ − x∗
x∗∗ − x∗ = 1,
so
F ′(1− F (d))F ′(d) = 1.
At the same time, since h(0) > 0 then h(·), crosses x∗ from above then it
has to be the case that it crosses x∗∗ from below implying that there are
points close to x∗∗ for which F ′(1 − F (x))F ′(x) > 1, which concludes the
contradiction.
The last proposition establishes when the sequence of polls will converge
to a fixed point.
Proposition 3. Let x∗ be the smallest fixed point of h(·). If F ′(1−F (x))F ′(x) <
1 holds in [0, x∗] then it is a sufficient condition for xkL to converge to x
∗.
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Proof. Define the sequence {an}∞n=0 with an ≡ x∗−xn. Now, let x0 ∈ [0, x∗)
and x1 ∈ (x0, x∗) and note that x∗ − xn = h(x∗) − h(xn−2). Then, by the
Mean Value Theorem, there exists dn−2 ∈ (xn−2, x∗) ⊂ (0, 1) such that:
h′(dn−2) =
h(x∗)− h(xn−2)
x∗ − xn−2 ,
and therefore
h(x∗)− h(xn−2) = h′(dn−2)(x∗ − xn−2).
or
x∗ − xn = h′(dn−2)(x∗ − xn−2),
so since F ′(1− F (x))F ′(x) < 1 there exists a K ∈ (0, 1) such that:
x∗ − xn ≤ K(x∗ − xn−2) ≤ K(K(x∗ − xn−4))
which by repeated substitution becomes:
x∗ − xn ≤
{
K
n
2 (x∗ − x0), n even
K
n−1
2 (x∗ − x1), n odd
Splitting {an}∞n=0 into two subsequences, one that has the odd-numbered
elements and another that has the even-numbered ones, we see that each
subsequence goes to zero, therefore since the two covering subsequences go
to zero {an}∞n=0 also goes to zero, which implies that
lim
n→∞x
n = x∗.
Therefore, if F ′(1− F (x))F ′(x) < 1 holds in [0, 1] then the complete in-
formation outcome is a unique fixed point of h(·), and a sequence of possibly
infinite polls will converge to it. In absence of fixed point uniqueness Propo-
sition 3 also tells us that if there is a fixed point x∗ such that x∗ < x∗ with x∗
being the fixed point corresponding to the complete information outcome,
and if F ′(1− F (x))F ′(x) < 1 is satisfied in the interval [0, x∗], then we will
have a mass of undecided voters located in [x∗, x¯∗], with x¯∗ = 1 − F (x∗).
In this case, the polls cannot lead to complete information, and there will
always be some positive mass of undecided voters in [x∗, x¯∗], no matter how
many polls will be conducted afterwards.
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Figure 1.4: Examples of h(x)
Inequality F ′(1 − F (x))F ′(x) < 1 may seem a little strange; however it
can be intuitively explained in the case of a symmetric distribution of the
undecided at period 0. It provides a sort of upper bound of the the maximum
of the probability density function, or putting it differently, an implicit lower
limit on the variance of the distribution. When most of the mass of the
undecided is located close to the mean of the distribution, their influence
in the elections is potentially so large that there can be no improvement in
information in the sense of having less undecided citizens.
To illustrate the insight of Theorem 3, I provide a couple of examples
with different citizen preference distributions. First, assuming that the dis-
tribution is uniform, we have that:
F ′(1− F (x))F ′(x) = 1
(1 + θ + η)2
. (1.4)
Given θ + η > 0, then 1
(1+θ+η)2
< 1 , therefore the sufficient condition
for uniqueness and convergence hold for all x ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand,
an extreme case when the condition fails is provided by a symmetric tri-
angle distribution with small masses of partizan voters. In fact, a simple
numerical application shows that for η = 0.05 and θ = 0.07 and the triangle
distribution, polls cannot improve the information since at least 98.5 per
cent of the voters in [0, 1] will remain undecided. In the next section I will
provide further examples of distributions for which the minimum undecided
mass can be between these two extremes examined here.
Figure 1.4 shows the plots of the h(·) function for the two cases mentioned
above. In the uniform case, there exists only the fixed point corresponding
to the complete information outcome, therefore, with enough polls, it can
be achieved. On the contrary, in the triangular distribution case, we can see
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that there are three fixed points: the complete information one in the middle,
the left one where xkL converges to, and the third one, which corresponds to
the point xkR would converge to. It is easy to see that the condition for x
k
L
to converge to the complete information outcome does not in fact hold. The
two non-middle fixed points define the interval where the minimum possible
mass of undecided citizens is located on.
In Appendix A, I examine an extension of the model analyzed here that
allows for some day-to-day political noise that can shift the ideological po-
sition of the citizens to the left or the right. The only significant difference
is that in this case the polls can never help reach the complete information
outcome, so there will always be some undecided voters.
At this point it should be mentioned that the mechanism will work the
same way if instead of only two parties we had three or more. The algebra
is more technically demanding, but the intuition is the same.
1.4 Implemented Policy and Citizen Welfare
In this section I will discuss the influence of polls on implemented policy and
on citizen welfare. After each poll we have a potential implemented policy
defined as follows:
xk = 1− pkL = 1− F (
xkL + x
k
R
2
)
If the conditions for the complete information outcome hold then xk will
converge to x∗.
Social welfare takes the form of a simple utilitarian function:
W (x) =
∫ 1+θ
−η
−u(|x− y|)dF (y) (1.5)
with x being the implemented policy and and y being the optimal policies
of each citizen. Recall that xk is the implemented policy we would have if
there were elections right after the k-th poll. Using xk in W (·) we find
the social welfare that would be obtained from implemented policy xk. In
the case of linear utility u(|x− y|) = |x− y|, the welfare function is strictly
concave in x as long as f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ D, and it has a maximum at
the point xM that satisfies:
1
2
= F (xM )
ie., at the median citizen. For −u(|x− y|) strictly concave in x it is
easy to see that this welfare function is also strictly concave in x but its
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Figure 1.5: Uniform distribution example
maximum will generally not correspond to the median citizen. For instance,
in the quadratic case, the maximum occurs at the mean of the distribution.
Focusing on the linear utility case, the welfare is increasing as the imple-
mented policy is getting closer to the median citizen and decreasing when
the implemented policy moves away from him. A first, trivial thing to notice
is that in case of complete symmetry, that is η = θ and symmetric distri-
bution, the implemented policy will stay at 0.5, resulting in the maximum
welfare possible, no matter the number of polls and no matter the mass of
the undecided because with each poll each party gets the exact same mass
of voters and they start with the same mass of partizans. The fact that the
welfare is strictly concave in the implemented policy can help us analyze
the social welfare using the levels of the implemented policy rather than
the levels of the welfare itself. In particular, if the density function is sym-
metric around the median, then welfare is a strictly increasing function of
the distance of the implemented policy from the median voter.18 Take the
18The first and second derivatives of W (·) are respectively: W ′(x) = −2F (x) + 1 and
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case of a uniform distribution of the voters and without loss of generality
assume that η > θ (since we have already discussed what happens in case
of symmetric distribution and η = θ in the end of the previous section), an
example of which, with η = 0.07 and θ = 0.05 is depicted in Figure 1.5.
This figure shows how the implemented policy moves with every poll, and
how far the implemented policy is from the median voter and the complete
information outcome x∗. It’s easy to see that neither the implemented policy
nor the distance to the median are monotonic in the number of polls. In fact
there are polls that are welfare reducing: the second poll is particularly bad,
taking the implemented policy away from the median voter but also away
from the complete information outcome. We have already seen that with
the uniform distribution the complete information outcome can be reached.
However this example shows that more polls are not always better from a
social point of view.
For the next example I will focus on a left-skewed distribution, in par-
ticular the Beta distribution with parameters α = 1.4 and β = 1.1. In
Figure 1.6 we have η = θ = 0.05. In this case we do not have convergence
to the full information outcome: there will always be undecided voters and
their mass cannot be lower than 67 per cent.
The implemented policy is decreasing on average, getting closer to the
full information outcome, but it will never converge to it. The implemented
policy converges to x = 0.56, while the complete information outcome is only
x∗ = 0.54: the distribution is skewed to the left so there are relatively more
undecided citizens located in ideologies close to R. The polls cannot reveal
information to the more centrist undecided citizens. Welfare is on average
decreasing with more polls, as the implemented policy is getting farther from
the median citizen. The polls cannot lead to complete information and on
average more polls make the citizens worse-off. Furthermore we can see that
if there are not many polls conducted then the welfare has high variability
from one poll to the other, and there are polls that are particularly bad in
terms of welfare.
If the conditions for the convergence to the complete information hold,
then we know that a sequence of polls can lead us to the complete informa-
tion outcome. However, even in this case, both the implemented policy and
the citizen welfare are not necessarily monotonic in the number of polls.
An interesting question is if it is beneficial for the society to have plenty
W ′′(x) = −2F ′(x) = −2f(x). Therefore for symmetric densities around the median xM
the curvature of the welfare is the same for any two points that are the same distance
from the median, so for any two such points the social welfare is the same.
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Figure 1.6: Beta distribution example, η = θ = 0.05
of polls before the elections or whether there should be restrictions on their
publication. The fact is that there is no way to know a priori if the polls
will be welfare increasing or decreasing. Given a support, there is an infinite
number of possible distributions, and in some of them the welfare will be
on average increasing and in some others on average decreasing. What we
can say however, is that with more polls, and as the implemented policy is
converging, the variability of the welfare will decrease.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper I examine a proportional representation voting model with polls
and in which voters suffer from regret that is able to capture actual elections
qualitative features, that to the best of my knowledge cannot be replicated
by other models. First, the lack of monotonicity of the share of the leading
party in the number of polls, second that the fact that a significant mass
of voters declares to be undecided in polls when asked about what they are
going to vote and that the mass of undecided is never increasing, and third
that there is a positive correlation between having a centrist ideology and
being undecided. The most important finding of the paper is that although
each poll weakly decreases the mass of undecided voters, a sequence of polls
may not always be able decrease this mass to zero and reveal the complete
information outcome to the citizens. Polls have a non-monotonic effect on
the implemented policy and social welfare. Finally, the average effect the
effect of polls on welfare is ambiguous: more polls do not necessarily lead to
higher social welfare.
1.6 Appendix A: Position Uncertainty
Even though the citizens have preferences over the implemented policy, it
can often be the case that their opinions can change from day to day, due to
random political noise. The assumption that this section maintains is that,
while a citizen’s ideological position can change due to random shocks, this
position will not stray to far away from his initial ideological position. I
will model this by assuming that the optimal policy for each voter can move
randomly around a small interval [−, ], with 0 <  < η, θ. This is the
only difference with the previous model. That is, using the distribution of
voter optimal policies we have previously defined as a reference, each voter’s
optimal policy can change from day to day, moving randomly in this small
interval.
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The timing of the new model is as follows. At time t the citizens calculate
[xtL, x
t
R], a poll takes place to which the voters respond truthfully, and then
a shock takes place. A shock for citizen with initial position y is a random
draw from the set [y − , y + ]. For some extreme L partizans we will have
that y −  < −η and similarly for some extreme right partisans we have
that y +  > 1 + θ. This means that there can be draws that can make
these partisans “fall over” the support D. If such draw takes place for a
partizan then for simplicity we will assume that the shock will just move
this citizen to the corresponding extremum of the support. For example,
take an L partizan with initial ideological position y = −η + /4. For this
citizen the set that his shocks belong to is: [−η − 3/4,−η + 5/4]. Now
assume that this citizens draw is equal to −η− /2 then this would lead the
citizen to outside the support D, so his draw will be corrected to be equal
to −η, the minimum point he can move to. The shock is the new ideological
position of the citizen. Some partizan voters, the most extreme ones, will
stay partizans even if they receive a very big shock in the opposite direction.
Afterwards we can have the elections, or we start over with a new poll. The
shock is not necessarily common to all voters. Now at the beginning of the
game, each voter y is aware of their initial optimal policy and the interval
[y − , y + ] that their optimal policy can fall into.
These random shocks from day to day, obviously affect the distribution
as they are moving masses of voters around. There are two interesting
“perturbed” distributions: the one that results if all voters receive the most
extreme negative shock meaning that all voters move the most they can
towards L, which we call F−(·) and one that results if if all voters receive
the most extreme positive shock (the one that moves all the most towards
R): F(·). To see how this difference in the model affects the results, we will
examine how a partizan voter would vote.
Take the left partizan voters, the ones whose initial optimal policies are
distributed in [−η, 0). We know already that x0L = 0 so the implemented
policy cannot be lower than 0. With no possible shock all of them would
want to vote for L. However with the possibility of a preference shock, the
partizan voters that are close to 0 know that there is the possibility of finding
themselves in the other side of 0. The partizan voters that are absolutely
sure of what to vote are the ones that are to the left of y0L = 0− . Similarly
the right partizan voters that are sure are the ones to the right of y0R = 1+.
We will call the ykL and y
k
R the highest possible cutoff for left voters after k
polls and the lowest possible cutoff for right voters after k polls respectively
and we will define them as follows: ykL ≡ xkL −  and ykR ≡ xkR + .
Then the mass of left voters that will be reported by a first poll will be:
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F (−) = F(0). The mass of the undecided will be: F (1 + ) − F (−) =
F−(1)−F(0). The minimum and maximum possible implemented policies
are: x1L = 1 − F (y0R) and x1L = 1 − F (y0L). Now voters with initial optimal
policies to the left of y1L ≡ x1L −  will know that they will not regret their
decision if they vote L, and so do the voters to the right of y1R ≡ x1R + .
If a second poll happens, then the we will have x2L = 1 − F (y1R) and x2R =
1− F (y1L) and generally:
xkL = 1− F (yk−1R ) (1.6)
xkR = 1− F (yk−1L ).
The proof of existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium follows the
same lines as before and is therefore skipped. Rewriting the previous two
equations and plugging the second one into the other we get:
xkL = 1− F (1− F (xk−2L − ) + ). (1.7)
If similarly to the previous subsection we define the function:
h(x) = 1− F (1− F (x− ) + ), (1.8)
we see that all the conditions for the existence of a fixed point still hold.
Now however, there is no fixed point that corresponds to full information in
the sense we have defined it previously. In other words, there does not exist
a fixed point where all the voters have made up their minds.
Proposition 4. The full information outcome cannot be achieved with un-
certainty in preferences.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists an s such that ysL = y
s
R = y
s+1
L =
ys+1R = y
∗
L = y
∗
R. Then we have to have:
x∗L −  = x∗R + 
or,
x∗L = x
∗
R + 2
which is a contradiction as x∗L cannot be greater than x
∗
R.
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We can also see that the results of Propositions 2 and 3 follow immedi-
ately using:
F ′(1− F (x− ) + )F ′(x− ) < 1 (1.9)
The natural next question is to find the fixed point that corresponds to
the “second best”, where the mass of the undecided voters is as low it can
get. An obvious candidate fixed point is a point where x∗L = x
∗
R = x
∗, that is,
the point that there is no uncertainty about the position of the implemented
policy anymore. Then, we will have y∗L = x
∗ −  and y∗R = x∗ + .
Proposition 5. There is no fixed point of h(·) of the form x∗L = x∗R = x∗.
Proof. Suppose that time s is the first time we observe xsL = x
s
R. Then
the mass of undecided voters becomes F (xsR + )−F (xsL − ), and we have:
xs+1L = (F (x
s
L − ) + F (xsR + ) − F (xsL − )) × 0 + (1 − F (xsR + )) × 1 =
1−F (xsR+). Similarly xs+1R = 1−F (xsL−), showing that xs+1L 6= xs+1R .
Proposition 5 tells us that there cannot be a situation where there is no
uncertainty about the implemented policy, which further implies that the
ideological distance between the last voter to vote for L and the first voter
to vote for R cannot be less than 2. The exact distance cannot be pinned
down without first knowing the distribution function.
What we take from the preceding analysis is that the added uncer-
tainty of preferences makes not only the full information outcome completely
unattainable, but also puts a lower bound on the measure of undecided vot-
ers. As  is getting smaller, more and more people are voting and we are
getting closer and closer to full information. On the other hand, with larger
, more voters stay away from the polls.
1.7 Appendix B: Further Empirical Analysis
The World Values Survey aims to provide insight on the political, social,
economic, and in general life attitudes of citizens from 59 countries. To this
end, it utilizes an extensive questionnaire. Using a measure of Undecidedness
the interest lies in showing that there is positive correlation between that
and being a moderate voter. In particular, the specification to be estimated
is the following:
Undecidedi = β0 + β1Centeri + β2NeverNationali
+ β3NeverLocali + β4NoTrusti + i
(1.10)
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Where i refers to a respondent and Undecided is a variable that takes
the value 1 if the respondent indicated that, in case there were elections
the next day, he either would not know what to vote, he would vote null or
blank, or not vote at all, and 0 otherwise. In the survey, Question 95 asks
the interviewees to state where they position themselves in the Left-Right
political spectrum, giving a number from 1 to 10, with 1 being Left and 10
being Right. The answers to this question constitute the variable Ideology.
Using the stated Ideology I constructed a series of variables called Center
as follows: Center56 assigns the value 1 if the respondent declared he places
himself on 5 or 6 (Ideology = 5 or Ideology = 6) and 0 otherwise, and simi-
larly for Center4567 and Center345678. The variables NeverNational and
NeverLocal take the value 1 if the respondent indicated that he never votes
in national or local elections respectively and 0 otherwise. NoTrust is a
variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent answered that he does not
trust political parties in the country and 0 otherwise. NeverNational and
NeverLocal are included to control for voters that (according to their own
answer) would never vote in elections, no matter who was running. Sim-
ilarly, NoTrust controls for voters that are in general mistrustful towards
parties which can make them vote less. Using the full country data and
after dropping observations for which there were no valid answers for the
variables examined, there are 53734 observations.
Table 1.2 depicts the results of the least squares estimations of (1.10)
using the three different Center definitions and with and without Coun-
try fixed effects. Country fixed effects are implemented by simply adding
a dummy variable for each country, the coefficients of which are not re-
ported in the table for the economy of space. Since these estimations are
of linear probability models, the results of columns (1) to (3), are found
by employing weighted least squares, using the fitted values of a first step
ordinary least squares estimation to construct appropriate weights.19 The
last three columns use a heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance ma-
trix for calculating the standard errors because the WLS method was not
appropriate.20 The results of each column tell the same story: voters that
never vote in elections are naturally more likely to be Undecided.
More interestingly, the results show that belonging ideologically to the
center implies a higher probability of being Undecided. Columns (1) and
(4) define the center in the strictest way. There we see that being in the
19More precisely, each model was estimated by OLS first. Then I calculated the esti-
mated standard deviation as follows: σˆi = (yˆi(1 − yˆi))1/2, provided that ∀i 0 < yˆi < 1.
Then the WLS estimation was conducted by simply using 1/σˆi as weights.
20Since not all fitted values of the initial OLS where such that 0 < yˆi < 1
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Table 1.2: LS Estimation Results of Specification (1.10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.078∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Center56 0.097∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Center4567 0.077∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Center345678 0.059∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
NeverNational 0.018∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NeverLocal 0.177∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NoTrust 0.108∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 53,734 53,734 53,734 53,734 53,734 53,734
Fixed Effects No No No Country Country Country
R2 0.235 0.234 0.233 0.241 0.240 0.237
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.234 0.233 0.240 0.239 0.236
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01 (4)-(6) use heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.
Table 1.3: Logit Estimation Results of Specification (1.10)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -2.293∗∗∗ -2.350∗∗∗ -2.355∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.033)
Center56 0.588∗∗∗
(0.021)
Center4567 0.503∗∗∗
(0.023)
Center345678 0.399∗∗∗
(0.027)
NeverNational 0.160∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
NeverLocal 0.859∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
NoTrust 0.785∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 53,734 53,734 53,734
Log Likelihood -26,871.970 -26,997.450 -27,137.050
Akaike Inf. Crit. 53,753.930 54,004.890 54,284.100
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
center, ceteris paribus, increases the probability of being Undecided by 9.7
and 8 per cent respectively. As the definition of the center is expanded, the
effect of being in the center on the probability of being undecided is still
positive and significant but falls monotonically. This shows that it is indeed
the more ideologically central voters that are more likely to be undecided.
As a robustness check Table 1.3 provides the coefficients of logit esti-
mations of (1.10). The results are qualitatively similar to the least squares
results. Furthermore, the least squares estimation was conducted after drop-
ping all the countries that are not parliamentary democracies. These results
are not reported here, but they are also qualitatively similar to the original
least squares ones.
As a further robustness check, I examined the effect of the ideological
position on the probability of being undecided using a measure of distance
from the center. For this I calculated the variable Distance1 as follows:
Distance1 =
{
5− Ideology if Ideology ≤ 5
Ideology − 6 if Ideology ≥ 6
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Table 1.4: Results of Specification (1.11)
(1) (2)
Constant 0.175∗∗∗ -1.705∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.027)
Distance -0.088∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.026)
Distance2 0.016∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007)
NeverNational 0.017∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.042)
NeverLocal 0.178∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.043)
NoTrust 0.106∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.027)
Method WLS Logit
Observations 53,734 53,734
R2 0.234
Adjusted R2 0.234
Log Likelihood -26,845.590
Akaike Inf. Crit. 53,703.180
Residual Std. Error 1.010 (df = 53728)
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
And then I estimated the following specification:
Undecidedi = γ0 + γ1Distancei + γ2Distance
2
i + γ3NeverNationali
+ γ4NeverLocali + γ5NoTrusti + i.
(1.11)
In Specification 1.11 the square of Distance1 is included so as to capture the
effects of the ideological distance that are potentially non-linear. The results
of the estimation of this specification are reported on Table 1.4. The results
show that an increase in the ideological distance from the center (positions
5 and 6), results in a decrease in the probability of being undecided, albeit
in a decreasing way.
The preceding analysis shows that, controlling for other variables, there
is a positive relationship between having a centrist ideology and being un-
decided. However, since it has been based on aggregate data, I will analyze
a few cases to see how it works in the country level. For this illustration
purposes I chose Sweden, Spain, Estonia and Greece.21 In addition, for the
21Other countries that were analyzed but whose results are not reported to save space
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individual country cases I also defined Distance2 to measure the distance
from the country median:
Distance2 = |Ideology −median(Ideology)|.
The first country to analyze is Sweden. A simple correlation coefficient
between Undecided and the two measures of the distance is: −0.22 and
−0.24 respectively. The regression results for Sweden are presented in Tables
1.5 and 1.6.
Since the median Ideology in Sweden is equal to 5, I have included al-
ternative specifications of the Center variables: Center5, center456 and
Center34567. The Swedish results are consistent with the aggregate find-
ings, with the only difference that NeverNational does not seem to play
a significant role in the probability of someone being Undecided and the
same holds for NoTrust. Dropping NoTrust does not result in different
qualitative results. Both distance specifications have the correct negative
sign, meaning that moving away from the center decreases the probability
of being undecided.
As for the Spanish results, the simple correlation between Undecided
and the two distance measures is: −0.23 and −0.30. Tables 1.7 and 1.8
are also consistent with the aggregate: being in the center implies a higher
probability of being undecided.
The two countries analyzed so far are consistent with the aggregate re-
sults. For comparison, I include the results of Estonia (Tables 1.9 and 1.10),
where being in the center has apparently no predictive power over the prob-
ability of being Undecided. The simple correlation between Undecided and
the two distance measures is: −0.03 and −0.04.
The last country to analyze is Greece, which unfortunately was not in-
cluded in the last wave of the World Values Survey so for this reason I had
to use the European Values Study of 2008.22 Although the two surveys
examine similar issues, the datasets are a little different. For example, in
the EVS there are no questions regarding the frequency of participation in
elections. Therefore, the variables NeverNational and NeverLocal cannot
be used. The variables that have to do with center and Trust are defined
in the same way. The variable NoInterest is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the respondent indicated that he is not very interested or not
are Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia and South Africa. The first four
of which give consistent results with the aggregate.
22EVS (2011): European Values Study 2008: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2008). GESIS
Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4800 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11004
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at all interested in politics. A final important, for our purposes, difference
between the two is how the variable Undecided is constructed. In the WVS
the relevant question asked what the interviewees would vote, if there were
elections the next day. On the other hand, in the EVS there are three ques-
tions examining this. First, question 263 asks whether the interviewee would
vote, had there been elections the next day. If the interviewee would answer
“yes” then question 264 asks what they would vote. If the interviewee would
asnwer “no” to question 263 then question 264 would be skipped and the
interviewer would ask question 265: “which party appeals to you the most”.
In this case, I coded as Undecided those who in question 263 stated that
they would not vote at all, those who stated they did not know whether
they would vote and those who gave no answer or answered “I don’t know”
to question 264. Table 1.11 is consistent to the previous findings.
From the table we see that Center5 itself is not statistically significant
but all the other Center variables are. Dropping NoTrust does not change
the results. The results of Greece for the distance specifications are in Ta-
ble 1.12.
Distance as defined with the variable Distance1 is significant but not
Distance2. Moving away from ideological positions 5 and 6, results in a
decrease in the probability of being undecided by 4.9 per cent. The sim-
ple correlation between Undecided and the measures of distance is: −0.13
−0.12. The results for Greece, although not as clear-cut as for Sweden or
Spain, show that there is a positive relationship between being ideologically
in the Center and being undecided.
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Table 1.5: WLS Sweden
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.063∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Center5 0.164∗∗∗
(0.035)
Center456 0.155∗∗∗
(0.022)
Center34567 0.114∗∗∗
(0.019)
Center56 0.182∗∗∗
(0.027)
Center4567 0.112∗∗∗
(0.019)
Center345678 0.080∗∗∗
(0.020)
NeverNational -0.051 -0.032 -0.016 -0.044 -0.022 -0.009
(0.041) (0.034) (0.042) (0.034) (0.041) (0.062)
NeverLocal 0.356∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.083) (0.102) (0.081) (0.086) (0.125)
NoTrust 0.027 0.036∗∗ 0.013 0.035∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.011
(0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 989 989 989 989 989 989
R2 0.131 0.133 0.095 0.137 0.126 0.079
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.129 0.091 0.132 0.121 0.074
Residual Std. Error (df = 984) 0.997 0.994 1.227 0.983 1.014 1.460
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Distance Sweden
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.206∗∗∗ -1.467∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.197) (0.031) (0.220)
Distance1 -0.128∗∗∗ -1.116∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.257)
Distance21 0.020
∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(0.006) (0.074)
Distance2 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.230)
Distance22 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.038
(0.005) (0.059)
NeverNational -0.013 -0.106 -0.017 -0.122
(0.046) (0.407) (0.045) (0.408)
NeverLocal 0.326∗∗∗ 1.985∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 2.006∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.475) (0.087) (0.475)
NoTrust 0.029 0.353 0.027 0.331
(0.019) (0.220) (0.019) (0.221)
Observations 989 989 989 989
Method LS Logit LS Logit
R2 0.107 0.110
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.106
Log Likelihood -308.166 -306.817
Akaike Inf. Crit. 628.331 625.633
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
(1) and (3) use heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.
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Table 1.7: LS Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.168∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ -0.030 0.156∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042)
Center5 0.219∗∗∗
(0.036)
Center456 0.233∗∗∗
(0.030)
Center34567 0.283∗∗∗
(0.028)
Center56 0.181∗∗∗
(0.032)
Center4567 0.168∗∗∗
(0.030)
Center345678 0.239∗∗∗
(0.035)
NeverNational 0.258∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
NeverLocal 0.038 0.040 0.047 0.063 0.051 0.038
(0.116) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.115)
NoTrust 0.110∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.034) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
Observations 937 937 937 937 937 937
R2 0.425 0.424 0.128 0.419 0.413 0.099
Adjusted R2 0.422 0.421 0.124 0.416 0.410 0.095
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, (3) and (6) use heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.
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Table 1.8: Distance Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.328∗∗∗ -0.851∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.227) (0.045) (0.236)
Distance1 -0.113∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.175)
Distance21 0.008 0.009
(0.007) (0.054)
Distance2 -0.129∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.174)
Distance22 0.006 -0.030
(0.007) (0.050)
NeverNational 0.295∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.530) (0.115) (0.571)
NeverLocal 0.034 0.136 0.012 -0.085
(0.113) (0.547) (0.116) (0.586)
NoTrust 0.121∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.221) (0.038) (0.223)
Observations 937 937 937
Method WLS Logit LS Logit
R2 0.425 0.149
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.144
Log Likelihood -555.126 -537.549
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,122.251 1,087.098
Residual Std. Error 1.002 (df = 931)
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01, (3) uses heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.
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Table 1.9: LS Estonia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.023
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Center5 0.003
(0.013)
Center456 0.010
(0.011)
Center34567 0.006
(0.012)
Center56 0.011
(0.011)
Center4567 0.003
(0.012)
Center345678 0.020
(0.015)
NeverNational 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
NeverLocal 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
NoTrust 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.019∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076
R2 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.121
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.118
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01 all specifications use heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.
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Table 1.10: Distance Estonia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0004 -5.138∗∗∗ -0.0002 -5.122∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.550) (0.012) (0.565)
Distance1 -0.007 -0.310
(0.013) (0.442)
Distance21 0.001 0.055
(0.004) (0.126)
Distance2 -0.007 -0.253
(0.012) (0.382)
Distance22 0.001 0.045
(0.003) (0.100)
NeverNational 0.128∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.422) (0.043) (0.422)
NeverLocal 0.078∗∗∗ 2.211∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 2.201∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.501) (0.025) (0.498)
NoTrust 0.020∗ 0.801∗ 0.020∗ 0.802∗
(0.010) (0.466) (0.010) (0.466)
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076
Method LS Logit LS Logit
R2 0.120 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.119
Log Likelihood -130.552 -130.750
Akaike Inf. Crit. 273.105 273.499
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01 LS specifications use heteroskedasticity-robust s.e.
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Table 1.11: LS Greece
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.159∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
Center5 0.027
(0.029)
Center456 0.073∗∗∗
(0.026)
Center34567 0.119∗∗∗
(0.026)
Center56 0.076∗∗∗
(0.027)
Center4567 0.115∗∗∗
(0.025)
Center345678 0.104∗∗∗
(0.029)
NoInterest 0.129∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
NoTrust 0.062∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.057∗ 0.056∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165
R2 0.281 0.282 0.284 0.283 0.285 0.283
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.280 0.282 0.280 0.283 0.281
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 1.12: Distance Greece
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.224∗∗∗ -1.198∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ -1.307∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.201) (0.035) (0.208)
Distance1 -0.049∗ -0.230
(0.029) (0.157)
Distance21 0.003 0.004
(0.007) (0.043)
Distance2 0.006 0.112
(0.024) (0.135)
Distance22 -0.008
∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.005) (0.032)
NoInterest 0.121∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.135) (0.026) (0.135)
NoTrust 0.063∗∗ 0.232 0.064∗∗ 0.206
(0.030) (0.187) (0.029) (0.188)
Observations 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165
Method LS Logit LS Logit
R2 0.285 0.283
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.280
Log Likelihood -659.747 -659.291
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,329.494 1,328.583
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗ < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
The Last Shall Be the First:
Failed Accountability Due to
Voters Fatigue and Ballot
Design
In 2000, Al Gore lost a significant amount of votes to Patrick Buchanan
in Palm Beach Country, Florida. Due to a confusing ballot design, around
two thousand voters may have voted for the latter by mistake (Wand et al,
2001). Later on, George W. Bush won the election in the state of Florida
by a thousand votes and became president of the United States. If a voter’s
behavior may be affected by the way in which the alternatives are presented
to him in strong democracies, we should pay attention to less developed ones
as well. It may be the case that the layout of ballots have a more pervasive
influence in younger democracies, because of either unintentional or deliber-
ate manipulation. Either way, the voters’ preferences would not be reflected
in the electoral results, which undermines the principle of accountability in
democracies.
In this paper, we use polling-booth level data to show that the ballot
design explains around 3% of the variation of the votes in a (removal) ref-
erendum in Lima in 2013. Moreover, we show that different layouts would
have led to completely dissimilar electoral results, changing the composition
of Lima’s local legislature in a significant way. Furthermore, we show that
the final political outcome may not have been representative of the pref-
erences of the electorate due to ballot-induced “choice fatigue”, i.e., when
voters are faced with simultaneous elections they are more likely to cast
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a vote in the ones listed first than in the ones listed last (Augenblick and
Nicholson, 2015).
In 2013, in an unprecedented measure to increase political accountabil-
ity, Lima’s citizens had the opportunity to remove each of the forty local
legislators, voting them out one by one. However, due to a combination
of poor ballot design and voters’ fatigue, rather than reinforcing account-
ability, this removal referendum penalized disproportionately the majority
coalition, whose legislators were placed first in the ballot.
This removal referendum allows us to investigate the effect of choice
fatigue on aggregate outcomes cleanly because voters’ preferences are un-
correlated with the candidates’ positioning in the ballot. Our identification
follows from the (quasi) random allocation of voters to polling booths, and
the location of the legislators in the ballot, which did not depend on their
popularity or other observable characteristics. Thus, controlling for precinct
unobservables and candidates observables, we can estimate the causal effect
of voters’ fatigue (due to the legislator’s position in the ballot) on the re-
moval referendum.
Our main finding shows the presence of choice fatigue: the share of
blank votes increases rapidly and continuously between the first and fortieth
candidate. Moreover, since candidates where listed in two columns, we also
identify a large jump of blank votes between the last candidate in the first
column and the first one in the second column.
Secondly, we estimate the effect of the existing fatigue on the probability
that any given candidate is removed from the local council, taking into
account that voters face three alternatives which do not need be independent
of each other – YES, NO and BLANK, where the first option is a favorable vote
toward recalling the candidate. Using the yes, no and blank shares by polling
booth (that is, 170 voters on average) we show that, not only the ballot
design had an effect on the vote shares, but also, more reasonable designs
would have had completely different outcomes. For instance, in the spirit
of King et al (2000), we simulate the electoral results under different ballot
designs and we show that with a ballot with a random order of legislators,
everybody but the mayor would have been removed from office.
As a result, a constitutional provision meant to increase accountability,
the removal referendum, combined with a poor implementation that did not
take into account (predictable) choice fatigue might have had counterpro-
ductive consequences. Since the twenty legislators listed first in the ballot,
representing almost the whole majoritarian coalition, had to be replaced
with a by-election, the removal referendum may have caused Lima’s council
to be less representative of voters preferences: after the new council was put
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together, around 46% of politicians came from the main opposition party
(PPC - Partido Popular Cristiano), whose seats increased from 9 to 16, even
though the maximum share of votes it had obtained in this period was less
than 30%1.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we discuss the insti-
tutional background, in Section 2.3 we explain our econometric strategy, in
Section 2.4 we show evidence of voters’ fatigue and we quantify the effect
of the ballot design on the electoral results by exploring the effects of using
alternative ballots. Finally, in Section 2.5, we discuss the implication of our
results and we conclude.
2.1 Literature
Our findings indicate the presence of a political “Peltzman effect” (Peltzman,
1975): the introduction of a provision meant to increase accountability may
have the opposite consequences if combined with poor implementation. In
our case, the unintended consequences arise due to a poorly designed ballot,
which did not take into account documented evidence about choice fatigue
(Augenblick and Nicholson, 2015) and other behavioral anomalies related to
the order in which the options are presented to consumers (Rubinstein and
Salant, 2006).
More generally, the puzzle of voting has caught the economists’ attention
since Downs (1957): if voting is costly, why do people vote in large elections
when the probability of being pivotal is arguably zero? The early theories of
the calculus of voting Riker and Ordeshook (1968); Downs (1957); Enelow
and Hinich (1981) draw on voters’ heterogeneity to explain abstention de-
cisions. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) highlights that a comprehensive
theory of turnout and abstention should also explain the phenomenon of
roll-off 2. Closer to the point in our paper, ballot design is not innocuous as
it may favor the candidates ranked first - priming effect (Esteve-Volart and
Bagues, 2012; Meredith and Salant, 2013)), or ranked last - anti-priming
effect (Alvarez et al, 2006). Augenblick and Nicholson (2015) suggests the
presence of voting fatigue using a natural experiment in California, and they
show that when an election appears sooner in a ballot, there is a significant
lower number of abstentions.
1And Peru Posible, another opposition party, moved from 1 to 7 legislators, even though
it obatined only 11% of the votes.
2As explained in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996): “Roll-off occurs when voters who
are already at the polls decide not to vote on a race or issue”.
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There is much evidence about the effect of the set and order of alterna-
tives on consumers’ choice outside political economy. Among others, Feen-
berg et al (2015) show that the order in which papers appear at a NBER
mailing list affects the short run number of citations, Liu and Simonson
(2005) show that pairwise comparison of products leads to more consump-
tion than a sequential one, and Glejser and Heyndels (2001) show that par-
ticipants who perform later in a music contest are more likely to get more
positive evaluations from the jury.3
2.2 Institutional Background and Data
Peru´ is a federal representative democracy subdivided into 25 regions and
the capital city, Lima. Each region is composed by provinces and districts.
Institutionally and politically, the Municipality of Lima has the status of
a region rather than a city, despite its name. It is also the largest city of
Peru with 8.5 million inhabitants and hosts the executive, judiciary and
legislative branches of the national government of Peru. In 2010, Susana
Villaran runs for mayor of Lima as the leader of a center-left coalition of
parties. In October of that same year, Villaran is the first elected woman
to become mayor of Lima.
2.2.1 Institutional Background
The city is run by a mayor (the maximum administrative authority of the
executive branch) and thirty nine city legislators - regidores.4 These forty
politicians are chosen in a municipal election every four years by popular
vote with a closed-list proportional rule that gives an automatic majority
(twenty out of forty regidores) to the party with most votes. All remaining
seats are assigned proportionally.5
Recall referendum: The Constitutional reform of 1993 added the pos-
sibility of calling for a recall referendum, known as Consulta Popular de
3From a theoretical perspective, Rubinstein and Salant (2006) point out that an in-
creasing number of choices are made out of list sets, and study the conditions under
which the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom (IIA) can be extended to a list-
IIA. Kamenica (2014) shows that choice overload can be exploited by a profit-maximizing
monopolist by introducing a premium loss leader product.
4As stipulated in Ley Organica de Municipalidades.
5Closed-list proportional rule implies that each party proposes a pre-defined list of 40
candidates and his substitutes, and citizens choose a party, without any interference on
the list composition.
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Revocatoria (CPR). This provision, meant to keep politicians accountable,
implies that all subnational politicians holding office can be exposed to a
non-confidence vote at (almost) any time of their mandate, except the first
and last year.
A referendum takes place only after a formal request signed by 25% of
the citizens that live in the jurisdiction of the politician under scrutiny. Up
until 2015, there was a cap on the signatures needed, which implies that in
the case of Lima only 400 thousand signatures are needed to proceed with
the recall referendum.
The electoral rule used is simple majority rule: if more than 50% of
the registered voters participate in the recall referendum and if the non-
confidence votes (YES votes) to a politician are more than the confidence
ones (NO votes), then he is recalled and he must be replaced. If more than
thirteen legislators are recalled, a new election takes place to replace them.
Otherwise, they are substituted by a party member who was on the closed
list presented by the party in the original election. If needed, in the by-
election, the new legislators are elected by a closed-list proportional rule
(without a bonus to the winner).
On the one hand, the potentiality of a recall should provide the incum-
bents with incentives to listen to their constituency and perform according
to their needs. On the other hand, this provision has given the elections’
losers an instrument to prevent the winner from governing: since its intro-
duction there were more than five thousand recall referenda, and 20% of the
recall initiatives were promoted by candidates who did not win the election.6
Electoral Management
The ONPE (“Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales”) is an independent
body in charge of organizing and administering the elections and referenda
in Peru. It was created in 1993, and among other tasks, is in charge of
designing the ballot papers. For the removal referendum of March 17th
2013, when forty candidates were up for removal, the final ballot design
sticked to the following rules: parties are ordered downward according to
the number of legislators and, within the party order, legislators are ordered
according to their order in the 2010 closed list, which was determined by
the parties. Hence, the ballot used in 2013 had the forty candidates listed
in two columns without including any partisan identification or picture, as
shown in Figure 2.1.
6According to ONPE (2010), in 2009, 36% of the initiatives were promoted by loosing
candidates (to mayor or legislators).
57
Voters: Voting is mandatory in Peru. When citizens turn 18 years old,
they are issued a national I.D. (D.N.I.) and they are assigned an “electoral
number” that determines the polling booth where they have to vote. This
number is assigned according to the order in which citizens got their I.D.
As we discuss later, a direct implication of this mechanism is that within a
polling center, any two polling booths, have the same ex-ante distribution
of votes.
2.2.2 Data
In 2010, there was a city-wide election to choose the municipal authorities.
Six parties or coalitions had managed to elect at least a legislator (see Table
2.7.2). In 2013, the forty legislators were put up for a confidence vote, in
which citizens had to decide, for each legislator, whether to remove him/her
(e.g. vote YES), or not (e.g. vote NO). In November 2013, a by-election
to elect the substitutes of the recalled candidates was held. We use the
electoral data of these elections and of each of the candidates subjected to
the removal referendum. Except for the electoral data by polling booth –
which was provided by ONPE after our request – all the data is available at
ONPEs website (www.onpe.gob.pe), unless stated otherwise.
Electoral data: The mayor and twenty one legislators belonged to coali-
tion Fuerza Social (FS), thirteen to coalition PPC - Unidad Nacional, two
from party Restauracion Nacional, one from party Cambio Radical, one from
party Somos Peru, and one from partySiempre Unidos.
There are 36,740 booths divided in 888 centers throughout Lima’s 43
districts. Polling booths do not all have the same number of registered
voters, but they cannot be larger than 300 voters, by constitutional design.
In 2013, the total number of the eligible voters was 6,357,243, with a turnout
rate of 83,7%. Figure 2.3 shows that the blank votes for each candidate
display a large variance, which increases with the position of the candidates
in the ballot. Figure 2.4, the actual votes for Yes and No for each candidate,
summarizes the results from the referendum: the mayor was kept in her
place, while candidates in positions 2 to 21, from Fuerza Social were recalled.
Also candidates in position 26 and 31, both from PPC - Unidad Nacional
were recalled (discussed below).
The support for all the parties is relatively stable across districts (see
Table 2.7.2), with the noticeable exception of PPC - Unidad Nacional, with
the largest standard deviation among the parties that have won a seat. This
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party obtained large support in less populated areas, with an average of
40%, even though the total actual share was 37.5%.
Candidates characteristics: Table 2.7.2 shows the candidates observ-
able characteristics, ordered by their position in the ballot. The median
legislator is a 49 years old male politician with college degree, who had won
a local election once, but with no experience in national politics. As it can
be seen by media exposure, the median candidate is almost unknown to the
voters. This variable is constructed with the mentions of the forty legisla-
tors or regidores in the period between 2010 and March 2013, in the five
most important newspapers from Peru´ (El Comercio, La Repu´blica, Peru´
21, Gestio´n and Correo). Although it is the variable with the most dispar-
ity, the median candidate has been mentioned only three times in the three
years previous to the removal referendum. The candidates with the most
mentions are the mayor (Villara´n, with 1068 mentions), and Luis Castan˜eda
Jr, the son of a previous mayor7.
2.3 Empirical strategy
To examine the relationship between the results of the removal referendum
for a legislator and her position in the ballot, we estimate two models, de-
scribed below.
2.3.1 Estimation strategy
To analyze the effect of candidates positioning in the ballot on his electoral
performance, we begin by analyzing the following linear model:
Yidl = αθd + βXl + γZl + εidl (2.1)
In Equation 2.1 we explain the share of blank votes of legislator in po-
sition l in polling booth i in precinct d, Yidl, as a result of the politicians
individual characteristics, Xl, and the position on the ballot, Zl. Last,
θd captures the precincts characteristics, either as a fixed effect or as other
variables such as poverty, depending on the specification. More importantly,
precincts refer to the geographical location of the polling booth, either the
polling center or the district, depending on the specification. To show the
7Castan˜eda Jr., who was allegedly behind the call for a removal referendum, may also
be confused with Luis Castan˜eda Sr., so we may be overstating his media exposure).
Incidentally, Castan˜eda Sr. was elected mayor when Villaran finished her mandate
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robustness of our results, we also explore the effect of the ballot design on
the share of blank votes per candidate with a non-linear probability model
with aggregate data. In all specifications we cluster the standard errors
by polling center, and in all estimations of Equation 2.1, the precinct fixed
effects are at the polling center level. 8
We also run a multinomial probit to explore non-linear effects on the
share of YES and NO votes in our specification. Our approach to the multi-
nomial estimation is based on a model of voting with additive noise, a la
Banks and Duggan (2005), explained in detail in the Appendix. Moreover,
these estimates are the main input for building the counterfactuals in the
next section.
Even though precincts fixed effects control for unobserved heterogene-
ity, there might be other confounding voters’ or candidates’ characteristics.
Both can be ruled out by design, as we explain in the next section. Regard-
ing the former, within a polling center, the allocation of voters to polling
booths is (quasi) random, hence in any two polling booths within a polling
center we should expect similar outcomes. Regarding the latter, the position
of the politicians in the ballot does not depend on individual characteristics,
but the parties’.
2.3.2 Identification strategy
Our identification relies on two sources of exogenous variation: the pre-
determined order of candidates in the ballot during the 2013 removal refer-
endum, and the (quasi) random allocation of voters to polling centers and
polling booths.
In the first place, the candidates order in the ballot is determined jointly
by the performance of their party/coalition in the 2010 elections, and their
position in the closed list for that same election. Hence, the main deter-
minant of the legislators position of the ballot, specially the column, is
not determined by his personal characteristics but by the party’s popular-
ity (nonetheless, we will also control for the candidates’ characteristics).
Moreover, since Fuerza Social and PPC-Unidad Nacional were coalitions of
parties, a politician’s position within the coalition would depend more on
his party bargaining power rather on his own skills or electoral potential.9
8Even though it should not be concern in our case due to the lack of information about
the legislators, we also use multiway clustering a la Cameron and Miller (2015). As we
will show in Table 2.11, the standard errors increase – as expected – but all our main
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
9In the next section we will provide some empirical evidence regarding the absence of
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To reinforce the idea that the votes for a politician in 2013 and his
position in the ballot cannot be jointly determined, we argue that the voters’
information on the candidates is very poor. The ballot design does not
include any other information than the candidates’ names, and except for
notable exceptions (the mayor and the son of the former mayor), all these
local legislators are relatively unknown to the population (except for Villaran
– in the first position – and Castan˜eda Jr. – in position thirty one, as
commented above).10
The second source of variation is also potentially important. Unobserved
heterogeneous preferences for parties or candidates across geographic areas
could potentially affect the estimates of the effect of the ballot design. In
areas where right-wing candidates are preferred, votes of confidence (no
recall) could be more likely for candidates located at the end of the ballot,
and the opposite would be the case for the candidates located above. A
similar phenomenon, with the opposite direction could occur on areas with
more left-wing preferences. All in all, a direct comparison between the
candidates results without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity could
bias the estimated effect of the ballot design.
In order to avoid this, we include school fixed effects, given that the citi-
zens’ political preferences are orthogonal to the voters’ allocation to polling
booths within precincts, by design: as citizens turn 18 years old and get their
I.D.s, they are automatically registered as voters in a given polling booth
and center. Thus, this allocation only depends on the order in which citi-
zens get their I.D. Concerns about cohort effects - if voters ideology depends
on age - are taken care of with the inclusion of polling-center fixed-effects,
which controls for heterogeneity across centers.11
Validity of the identification strategy
As shown in Figures 2.1 (the actual ballot) and 2.2 (the ballot with party
identification), at the time of voting, citizens have no information about
the candidates except for their last names. Concerns with our identifica-
tion strategy may arise if voters knowledge about the seating legislators was
correlated with their position in the ballot. Nonetheless, these local politi-
cians are not only unknown, but also they lack significant previous political
experience (see Table 2.4).
Moreover, if voters had used other informational cues, e.g. being first
correlation between Order and individual characteristics.
10In particular, there are not even party identifiers in the ballot.
11Cantu´ (2013) and Casas et al (2014) use a similar identification strategy.
61
within the closed-party list, we should observe jumps in the number of blank
votes. In Figure 2.5, that shows the change in blank vote shares between
any two consecutive candidates in the ballot, we can see that the only jumps
in that variable occur for the mayor, with the change of column and with
Castan˜eda. In all other cases, including the jump from one party to the
other, the increase in blank shares is steady.
Last, despite Lima’s large population density, it could be argued that
within a polling center, across polling booths, there could be selection of
voters, undermining our identification strategy. Fortunately, we can even
add polling booth fixed effects to account for this possible source of bias due
to omitted variables. While in the appendix we show that our results would
not change, confirming that there is no such problem of endogeneity – the
coefficients are statistically identical to our main regressions – we prefer the
polling center fixed effects.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Determinants of voting blank
The effect of order, column and the candidates’ characteristics on the share
of blank votes per candidate are reported in Table 2.7. Remarkably, in all
specifications the signs of almost all of our estimates are the same, even
when we omit the polling center fixed-effects, suggesting that our estimates
do not depend of the distribution of preferences within a polling center.
In all models, the position of the legislator on the ballot has a very strong
effect on his share of blank votes: the coefficients of Order, Column and
their interaction are all statistically significant at the 1% level. While Order
and Column are positive, indicating that being further down the ballot
leads to more blank votes, the interaction coefficient is negative. Across
all specifications, being ten positions further away implies an increase in
blank votes by 1.3 percentage points. Furthermore, being in the second
column increases the blank votes in 4.4 percentage points. This evidence
indicates that citizens follow the order in which candidates appear in the
ballot, instead of jumping across columns.12
Some remarks are in order: although the effect of the order in which the
legislator is placed is an important predictor of the share of blank votes,
this effect decreases in the second column. The blank share is increasing
12One could think that voters begin by looking at the first two candidates in the first row
– candidate 1 and 21 – instead of the first two candidates in the first column – candidates
1 and 2. This is ruled out by the data.
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at a lower rate compared to the first column. One possible interpretation
of this result is that voters who keep voting in the second column may
have a lower cost of voting, i.e., there is a selection of voters. Hence, the
rate at which they stop voting is smaller. This interpretation may have
implications beyond the decision to abstain: if voters “self-select” into the
second column, their preferences and their voting behavior may differ in
comparison to the set of voters in the first column. It could be worrying
that the cost of voting is correlated with preferences. A first attempt to
correct this issue is in column (3) of the same table, where we control for
the voters preferences in the previous election (the variable “Party share in
2010”). We observe no change in our estimates, which suggests that the
above mentioned correlation does not take place here.13
Both the coefficients of for Villaran (position 1 - Mayor) and Castan˜eda
are significant with a negative sign, showing that controlling for ballot ef-
fects, party affiliation and other individual characteristics voters were more
likely to express their opinion about these two compared to the remaining
ones. These findings are consistent with what we see in Figure 2.3.
Focusing in column (3), where we have the extended set of covariates
of individual characteristics we see that none of them has a great effect
on the blank vote behavior, in comparison to Order and Column. This is
also in line with our identifying assumption: with the exception of the two
famous faces of the campaign (Villaran and Castan˜eda) the public cannot
distinguish among different officials in the ballot. Nonetheless, if anything,
exposure has a negative effect: having been a candidate in a previous na-
tional election, won or not, and having won a local election, decreases the
blank shares. We find the same effect with the number of mentions in na-
tional newspapers (the variable “media exposure”).
Finally, belonging to the right-wing coalition (PPC - Unidad Nacional)
further increases the share of blank votes by 4.4 percentage points. Table 2.8
shows the squared semi-partial correlation coefficients for the linear estima-
tion of column 3 of Table 2.7. Order and Column account for most of the
variance in the model. Columns (4) to (6) indicate that our results do not
depend on the linearity imposed in the first three columns. 14
13We also address this issue in our multinomial specification.
14Even though our identifying assumptions are not too demanding, it could be argued
that within a polling center, there may be significant differences across polling booths
that may be biasing our results. In Column (2) of Table (2.11), we show the results with
polling booth fixed effects, and the coefficients are identical. Moreover, in the first column
of that table we cluster the standard errors in a different way, following Cameron and
Miller (2015) multi-way clustering. This clustering is more demanding and increases the
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As a further robustness check we compare what happens when we drop
all covariates and in their place we substitute forty dummies, one for each
position in the ballot. Pairwise comparisons of the coefficients show that all
are statistically significant from each other. Figure 2.6 depicts the coeffi-
cients of the dummies.
Before we continue to the next subsection, we need to examine if there
are any empirical evidence regarding the correlation of the Order variable
with any personal characteristics of the officials. To examine this, we run
a simple regression, Order against all valid personal characteristics, for all
forty officials, but also by restricting our attention to the left-wing and to the
right-wing coalition. The estimation results are in Table 2.6. The sample
is very small (only forty observations) but using the full sample we see that
the only two significant variables are the College dummy and the Elected in
national elections one. However, the elected variable is essentially a dummy
since there is only one official that has ever been elected at the national
level, so it would naturally be highly correlated with the Order variable.
The College dummy is very significant and positive which is driven by the
fact that for all right-wing officials the dummy is equal to 1 (this is the
reason why, the College dummy is dropped when we restrict the sample
only on the right-wing officials). When we examine the two other samples
separately we see that the Elected in national elections variable is dropped,
since within coalitions there is no variation. In the fourth column of the
table, we use as a dependent variable the order of the officials in their own
party’s closed list.15 The results are not qualitatively different, with the
exception of the significance of media exposure. In any case, the sample size
is even smaller in these cases, so naturally we expect large standard errors.
Nevertheless, we do not have any evidence that would suggest that the order
is correlated with any observable characteristics.
2.4.2 Analysis of the probability of being removed from office
Table 2.9 depicts the results of the multinomial probit in which the prob-
ability of voting blank is the baseline. The upper table shows the results
for the NO and the lower part the YES ones, always with respect to blank.
Our preferred specification is in the third column, where we control both
for District fixed effects and the extended set of covariates, but the three
standard errors, but still all our coefficients of interest are significant at the 1% level.
15This means, for example, that the officials in positions 23 to 35 are re coded from 1
to 13.
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estimated models are qualitatively similar.16 The effect of Order, Column
and their interaction are in line with our previous results: the share of YES
and NO decreases with respect to the blank votes as the candidates are fur-
ther down in the ballot. Interestingly, while both coefficients for Mayor are
positive, indicating a relatively divided opinion about keeping her or not,
the coefficients on Castan˜eda are negative for NO vote and positive for YES.
This result shows a large level of agreement on removing him from the local
council in Lima, in line with Figure 2.4. The effects of Party Share in 2010
elections have the expected signs: the higher the party share of an official,
the more likely that this official receives a no vote compared to a blank one,
which is also more likely compared to a no one.
Since the coefficients of YES and NO vote of each covariate are often quite
similar, pairwise statistical comparisons were in order. In all columns, all
coefficients are statistically different between the YES and NO equations with
the exception of the minor party dummy coefficient, who is only statistically
different between the two equations only in the third column. The difference
in model fitness between the first column and the other two may indicate
the presence of heterogeneity among the districts which we address below.
Analysis by district. Table 2.10 shows the results of the multinomial
probit in two districts: Villa El Salvador and San Isidro. Villa El Salvador
is the district where “Fuerza Social” (the incumbent party) obtained their
highest share in the 2010 election, whereas San Isidro is the district where
“PPC-Unidad Nacional” got their highest share, which is the same district
where Fuerza Social got their lowest share. Although all the coefficients are
consistent with our previous results, some very interesting patterns emerge.
The effects of Order and Column are larger in column (1), a left-wing
district, than in column (2), a right-wing one. Hence, the design of the
ballot seems to have more pervasive effects in the district where the mayor
16To estimate the probit model with district fixed effects, we create a dummy variable
for each district. Being a non-linear model, this could be problematic, given that these
models are known to have small sample bias when the group sizes are small (Greene,
2004). In our case, however, the average number of tables per district is around 840, so
this problem would be less of a concern. Additionally, the results shown that controlling
for the unobserved district characteristics does not seem to greatly affect the estimated
coefficients, so that the panel model could be consistent with a model with random, rather
than fixed, effects. Heckman (1981) showed that the small sample bias in this case would
be “surprisingly small”. Last, we are not concerned about consistency of the estimators,
as the models with and without fixed effects result in estimates of the same direction and
magnitude. Nonetheless, in our simulations we use by-district specifications, as we explain
below.
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was elected with the largest share. Although this results does not threaten
our identification strategy, in order to make policy recommendations we have
to take into account the districts’ heterogeneity of preferences, as we do in
the next section.17
2.4.3 Counterfactual Analysis and Discussion
Based on our previous results, we analize what would have happened in Lima
if the design of the ballots were different. Since the legislators’ location is
the main explanatory variable, we explore designs that change their position
in the ballot: in particular, we randomize the order of the legislators and/or
we eliminate the columns.
Since we have to incorporate the districts’ hetoregeneity to provide the
most accurate counterfactuals, we do the analysis by district (for the 43 dis-
tricts, as with El Salvador and San Isidro above), we collect the estimated
coefficients and, taking into account the districts size, we perform our ex-
ercises. Figure 2.7 shows the fitted values of the multinomial probit model
(run by district). Comparing with the actual results in Figure 2.4 we see
that the model does a good job reproducing the referendum results.
In order to see how the ballot design affected the referendum result we
force the Column and Order coefficient to be zero for all officials. Hence
we obtain the predicted values as if the ballot design had no effect: Fig-
ure 2.8 shows this result.18 For all officials except the mayor, the YES votes
are a majority, meaning that everybody except the mayor would had been
recalled. In practical terms, this result shows what the outcome would had
been if every voter received a different single-column ballot where the order
of the officials was completely randomized.
In order to be more precise, we simulate the elections varying the order
and the columns. First, we assigned each district a different random order
in the ballot, calculated the referendum result predictions, and repeated this
process one thousand times. Then we collected the results of the repetitions
and calculated the share of recalls for each official. Figure 2.9 shows the
result of this process when assuming a two-column ballot and Figure 2.10
shows the result assuming a single column. Starting with the latter, we see
17Related, but less surprising is the fact that the share of NO votes for Villaran, the
mayor, is larger with respect to the blank votes in the left-wing district than in the righ-
wing one (San Isidro). Similarly, Castan˜eda has larger support in San Isidro, while the
voters in Villa El Salvador do not show any differential treatment of this candidate.
18The figure where we shut down only the column differs from Figure 2.8 only in the
sense that both YES and NO vote lines have a negative trend without intersecting.
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that in almost all repetitions, it is only the mayor who is not getting recalled.
On the other hand, with two columns in almost all repetitions it is only the
mayor who survives the recall from her coalition. As for the opposition,
Castan˜eda gets recalled almost always, while the rest of the officials of the
right-wing coalition get recalled some of the time.
The predicted values and the simulations point into the same direction:
the ballot design had given an “unfair” advantage to all the legislators lo-
cated in the second column. A proper randomization, even keeping two
columns, would have ended up in completely different electoral outcomes.
For simplicity of interpretation, let us focus on the case with a single column.
If all legislators had been recalled, the final composition of the city council
after the by-election for the new members would have ended up having only
less than a third of legislators from the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC).
Instead, because the ballot design gave a safer position to the legislators
located in the second column, as it was the case for the PPC ones, these leg-
islators were not removed. As a result, the final composition of the council
included the new seven legislators elected in the by-election plus the other
nine elected in the 2010 election. The sixteen legislators from PPC represent
41% of the council, even though this party never obtained more than 30% of
the votes. Hence, the possibility of the recall referendum, intended to keep
politicians accountable during their term, ends up having adverse effects on
the representativity of the political institutions.
2.5 Conclusion
On one hand, Peru’s Constitution allows for an ad-hoc recall of politicians
during their tenure. This provision, together with regular elections, makes
politicians more accountable to their citizenry. In particular, it is meant
to address the issue of moral hazard by increasing the instances in which
citizens can remove politicians from office. Moreover, as instance of direct
democracy, it also allows for a more direct supervision of the politicians
activities and decisions.
On the other hand, we showed that the implementation of this provision
and the “removal referenda” have to be taken very seriously. A poorly de-
signed ballot may have consequences that go against the spirit of the rule of
law, as it may have been the case in Lima’s 2013 referendum. Rather than
their performance, the order in which legislators were listed in the ballot
and the column in which they were placed were the main determinants of
being removed from office: the legislators position and column are better
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predictors of the electoral results than education, partisan affiliation, po-
litical experience, and presence in media – jointly, they are two thousand
times better predictors than the other variables (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). As
a result, the politicians listed in the second column were more likely to be
confirmed in office, only due to their position in the ballot.
Unfortunately, this case shows yet another instance in which institutional
design has unintended consequences. The old adagio – institutions matter –
may still be true, but institutional reform has to be accompanied with a thor-
oughly thought implementation. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that
electoral transparency scholars and international electoral observers may
also need to devote attention to ballot design. If these “details”, like bal-
lot design, may tilt elections in developed and strong democracies, younger
democracies’ accountability mechanisms may be threaten by a greater ex-
posure to manipulation.
Last, we also proposed an under-exploited identification strategy: the
combination of polling-booth level data with a deep understanding of the
assignment of voters to polling booths – in our case according to the I.D.
number. Yet, beyond the purposes of this paper, this strategy can be used
in different countries and contexts in which this disaggregation of data is
available.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Institutional background
According to the Ley organica de Elecciones, Law number 26859, the fol-
lowing articles define how voters are allocated to polling booths. Article 52
states that there must be between 200 and 300 voters per polling booth19,
and Article 53 states that they are allocated according to their order of
registration in the district20.
According the Ley de elecciones Municipales 26864, the apportionment
of the regidores is as follows: Art´ıculo 25o Eleccio´n de Regidores del Concejo
Municipal
19Art´ıculo 52o En cada distrito pol´ıtico de la Repblica se conforman tantas mesas de
sufragio como grupos de 200 (doscientos) ciudadanos ha´biles para votar como mı´nimo y
300 (trescientos) como ma´ximo existan. El nu´mero de ciudadanos por mesa de sufragio
es determinado por la Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales.
20Art´ıculo 53o Las mesas tienen un nmero que las identifica y las listas de electores por
mesa se hacen sobre la base de los ciudadanos registrados en la circunscripcio´n, en orden
nume´rico.
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Los Regidores de cada Concejo Municipal son elegidos por sufragio directo
para un per´ıodo de cuatro (4) an˜os, en forma conjunta con la eleccio´n del
Alcalde. La eleccio´n se sujeta a las siguientes reglas:
1. La votacio´n es por lista.
2. A la lista ganadora se le asigna la cifra repartidora o la mitad ma´s uno
de los cargos de Regidores del Concejo Municipal lo que ma´s le favorezca,
segu´n el orden de candidatos propuestos por las agrupaciones pol´ıticas. La
asignacio´n de cargos de Regidores se efectu´a redondeando el nu´mero entero
superior.
3. La cifra repartidora se aplica entre todas las dema´s listas participantes
para establecer el nu´mero de Regidores que les corresponde.
4. El Jurado Nacional de Elecciones dentro de los quince (15) d´ıas sigu-
ientes a la vigencia de la presente Ley, aprobara´ las directivas que fuesen
necesarias para la adecuada aplicacio´n de lo dispuesto en el presente art´ıculo.
Texto modificado por el Art´ıculo 1o de la Ley No 27734, publicada el
28-05-2002.
CONCORDANCIA:
Ley No 26859, Art. 29o
R. No 1248-2006-JNE
2.6.2 Multinomial Probit
Having found an influence from the location in the voting ballot on the
decision to not make a decision (blank vote), we also try to study whether
the location can also affect the decision to finally mark a yes or no in the
ballot. We do not expect an influence of location on preferences, but since
the latter can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the voters
(different motivation to participate in this particular electoral process by
political leaning, for example), there could be an influence into the actual
voting. On the other hand, while this model (under its own assumptions)
can also help to generate counterfactual scenarios of voting behavior under
different configurations of the ballot, it has to be taken as a guidance of the
empirical work rather than a literal explanation of the voting behavior.
We follow the discrete choice framework. In this formulation we consider
a voter that has to choose between three alternatives for each candidate:
vote in favor of the recall (yes), vote against (no), or express no preference
(voting blank). We denote the voter as i, who is located in the district d (in
the estimations we use district, polling center or polling booth, but here for
simplicity we call it district generically). His or her choice for candidate c is
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denoted by j, where:
j =

2 if the vote is YES
1 if the vote is NO
0 if the vote is BLANK
We assume that the drivers behind this decision are the utilities that the
voter enjoys from taking each decision, which we call Uijcd. The indexes
indicate that this is the utility that voter i, who votes in district d, enjoys
for choosing alternative j for candidate c. This utility can be affected by
several characteristics of the candidates, as well as the preferences of the
voter. Some of the candidates characteristics are observed, like their location
in the ballot (the order and/or the column) so we include them in vector xc
(we also add here a dummy variable for the major Villara´n and candidate
31, Castan˜eda Jr., who were particularly salient during the whole process).
Another set of utility drivers could be unobserved, for example, electoral
preferences: left wingers (the majors political leaning), or voters that were
distrustful of the main sponsor of the whole recall process (Castan˜eda, the
father of the candidate 31 and former major), would probably obtain higher
satisfaction from alternative NO, and conversely. To capture the influence of
additional unobservables we also include two random drivers of the utility.
The first is the random variable θd, which captures the average preferences
in district d. The final term, ijc is a zero mean shock that captures any
idiosyncratic preference for option j for candidate c for voter i. Finally, we
assume a linear shape, so that the utility takes the form:
Uijcd = xcβj + θjd + ij (2.2)
for j = {0, 1, 2}. The voter i will pick option j if this option gives greater
utility than any other. That is, the probability that voter i picks option j
for candidate t is:
Pi(y = j) = Prob(Uijcd ≥ Uij′cd, ∀j′ 6= j).
Let ij = (i2, i1, i0) be the vector of idiosyncratic utility terms for the
alternative of voting yes (2), no (1) or blank (0) of voter i. Let φ(2, 1, 0)
be its multivariate normal distribution, so we can estimate a multinomial
probit. Finally, let Vjcd = xcβj + θjd be the mean utility obtained from
choice j, given that the  terms has a zero mean. Hence
Pi(y = j) =
∫
I(Vjcd − Vj′cd ≥ ijc − ij′c)dF (ij),∀j′ 6= j,
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For simplicity, we write Vjcd for yes (2), no (1) and blank (0) as follows: v2,
v1 and v0, and similarly with the random variables 2, 1 and 0. Hence the
probability of voting YES is
Pi(y = 2) =
∫ ∞
2=−∞
∫ v2−v1+2
1=−∞
∫ v2−v0+2
0=−∞
φ(2, 1, 0)d2d1d0
Minimizing the observed YES and NO shares observed for each candidate
in each table with the ones predicted according to the previous equations
we identify estimates for the sets of parameters β and θ for YES and NO,
with respect to blank. That is, we identify the terms in parenthesis in the
equations below.
V2cd − V0cd = xc(β2 − β0) + (θ2d − θ0d) (2.3)
V1cd − V0cd = xc(β1 − β0) + (θ1d − θ0d) (2.4)
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Figure 2.1: Ballot as seen by the vot-
ers
Figure 2.2: Ballot as published in a
newspaper
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2.7.2 Tables
Eligible Voters 6295952 Booths 36386
Turnout 5273790 Centers 888
Turnout % 83.8 Districts 43
Relative Sizes Min Max Average Sd
Voters per Booth 112 240 173 28
Voters per Center 1088 52460 7090 4467
Booths per Center 7 242 41 25
Voters per District 1298 631100 146417 134506
Booths per District 7 3529 846 770
Centers per District 1 79 21 18
All numbers are calculated after we dropped all ob-
servations for which all votes cast for an official at a
specific booth where coded as “null.”
Table 2.1: Description of 2013 Lima Referendum Data
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Table 2.2: Individual Characteristics of Elected Officials
Official Party Age Gender National Level Local Level Education Media
Times Run Elected? Times Run Times Elected Level Exposure
SUSANA VILLARAN FS 65 Female 1 No 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 1068
EDUARDO ARIEL ZEGARRA MENDEZ FS 51 Male 1 No 1 1 PhD (Economics) 111
MARISA GLAVE REMY FS 33 Female 0 N/A 2 2 Secondary 41
RAFAEL EDUARDO GARCIA MELGAR FS 59 Male 0 N/A 2 2 Bachelor (not completed) 4
PERFECTO VICTOR RAMIREZ CIFUENTES FS 65 Male 2 No 2 1 Secondary 5
ZOILA ELENA REATEGUI BARQUERO FS 34 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 4
LUIS VALER CORONADO FS 61 Male 3 0 4 3 Technical School 16
MARCO ANTONIO ZEVALLOS BUENO FS 40 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master (not completed) 21
SIGIFREDO MARCIAL VELASQUEZ RAMOS FS 54 Male 1 No 2 1 Post-graduate specialization 1
VICTORIA DE SOTOMAYOR COTRADO FS 26 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (in progress) 3
LUISA MERCEDES MARTINEZ CORNEJO FS 33 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 1
DORA BEATRIZ HERNANDO SANCHEZ FS 53 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 2
INES CECILIA RODRIGUEZ VELASQUEZ FS 56 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 1
JOSE LIBORIO ESTEVES ROBLES FS 60 Male 0 N/A 2 1 Bachelor 2
MONICA GISSELLA ERAZO TRUJILLO FS 33 Female 0 N/A 1 1 2
MANUEL ABELARDO CARDENAS MUOZ FS 52 Male 0 N/A 1 1 1
CAYO TITO QUILLAS FS 54 Male 0 N/A 2 1 Post-graduate specialization 14
OLGA CELINDA MORAN ARAUJO FS 50 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 0
RONALD GONZALES PINEDA FS 29 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 3
MAIA LIBERTAD ROJAS BRUCKMANN FS 37 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Master 2
PEDRO JAVIER LOPEZ TORRES TUBBS FS 36 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master (in progress) 1
HERNAN NUEZ GONZALES FS 29 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor (not completed) 1
WALTER ARCESIO GUILLEN CASTILLO PPC 51 Male 0 N/A 3 3 Master 1
JAIME EDUARDO SALINAS LOPEZ TORRES PPC 51 Male 3 No 4 1 Master 4
EDGARDO RENAN DE POMAR VIZCARRA PPC 52 Male 1 No 3 1 Master 6
JOSE ALBERTO DANOS ORDOEZ PPC 67 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 2
MONICA EMPERATRIZ SARAVIA SORIANO PPC 45 Female 1 NO 1 1 Master 0
JORGE RAFAEL VILLENA LARREA PPC 35 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 4
LUZ MARIA DEL PILAR FREITAS ALVARADO PPC 63 Female 1 NO 1 1 Master 0
PABLO ALBERTO SECADA ELGUERA PPC 43 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 55
LUIS MANUEL CASTAEDA PARDO PPC 29 Male 0 N/A 2 2 Bachelor 237
TERESA DE JESUS CANOVA SARANGO PPC 54 Female 0 N/A 1 1 Post-graduate specialization 8
ALBERTO VALENZUELA SOTO PPC 43 Male 0 N/A 2 1 Master 26
OSCAR JAVIER IBAEZ YAGUI PPC 37 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 3
LUIS FELIPE CALVIMONTES BARRON PPC 48 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Bachelor 7
RUBEN SANTIAGO GAVINO SANCHEZ RN 54 Male 1 No 1 1 Bachelor 2
IVAN BECERRA HURTADO RN 42 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 3
GERMAN RICARDO APARICIO LEMBCKE SP 70 Male 0 N/A 5 5 Bachelor 3
FERNAN ROMANO ALTUVE-FEBRES LORES CR 46 Male 2 Yes 2 1 Master 21
LUIS FELIPE CASTILLO OLIVA SU 38 Male 0 N/A 1 1 Master 8
The “Run at” columns display how many times this official has run in local or national elections before the 2010 elections. The “Elected at National Level” column
shows if an official had been elected at the national level before the 2010 elections, and the “Elected at Local Level” show how many times the official has been elected
at the local level before the 2010 elections with N/A implying “Not Applicable”. Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the leading Peruvian
newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table 2.3: Results of 2010 Municipal Election of Lima
Party Min. Share Max. Share Av. Share Sd. of Shares Seats
Fuerza Social 0.202 0.463 0.353 0.07 22
Partido Popular Cristiano - Unidad Nacional 0.239 0.665 0.404 0.113 13
Restauracio´n Nacional 0.039 0.183 0.081 0.026 2
Somos Peru´ 0.017 0.115 0.044 0.021 1
Cambio Radical 0.008 0.192 0.043 0.032 1
Siempre Unidos 0.005 0.138 0.027 0.033 1
Accio´n Popular 0.012 0.118 0.024 0.016 0
Alianza Para el Progreso 0.001 0.111 0.016 0.021 0
Partido Fonavisto del Peru´ 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.004 0
The second and third column refer to the maximum and minimum share a party got in a district. “Average Share” and
“Sd. of share” give the average and standard deviation of the district shares. Seats gives us the number of seats the
party got.
The first two “parties” are coalitions. Fuerza Social coalition includes: Fuerza Social, Movimiento Tierra y Libertad,
Movimiento Nueva Izquierda, Movimiento Lima para Todos and independent candidates. PPC-Unidad Nacional coalition
includes: PPC-Unidad Nacional, Solidaridad Nacional, Peru Posible, and independent candidates.
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Minimum Maximum Average Median Sd
Age 26 70 46.95 49 11.97
Times Candidate National 0 3 0.42 0 0.81
Times Candidate Local 1 5 1.57 1 0.98
Times Elected Local 1 5 1.27 1 0.78
Imputed Years of Education 11 20 15.47 15.5 1.94
Media Exposure 0 1068 42.35 3 171.3
The years of education have been imputed using the highest known educational level
of the official, taking half of the duration if this educational level was not completed.
Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the leading Peruvian
newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Elected Officials
Party Min. Share Max. Share Av. Share Sd. of Share Seats
Partido Popular Cristiano 0.155 0.555 0.316 0.097 7
Somos Peru´ 0.168 0.515 0.268 0.06 6
Peru Posible 0.04 0.19 0.099 0.033 2
Siempre Unidos 0.021 0.335 0.092 0.08 2
Accio´n Popular 0.068 0.298 0.102 0.037 2
Tierra y Dignidad 0.033 0.11 0.075 0.015 2
Partido Humanista Peruano 0.04 0.19 0.099 0.033 1
The second and third column refer to the maximum and minimum share a party got in
a district. Average Share and Sd of share give the average and standard deviation of the
district shares. Seats gives us the number of seats the party got.
Table 2.5: Results of 2013 Municipal By-Election of Lima
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Full Sample Only Left Only Right Full Sample
(by coalition)
College 13.9∗∗∗ 1.46 -2.70
(3.24) (3.37) (2.35)
Age -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 -0.050
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.083)
Gender 5.85 2.08 -1.31 -0.81
(3.71) (3.52) (3.02) (2.26)
Candidate in national elections -0.21 -2.25 -2.56 -3.18∗
(3.26) (2.82) (1.93) (1.88)
Candidate in local elections -2.22 2.30 0.14 1.36
(4.04) (4.78) (2.31) (1.97)
Elected in national elections 15.3∗∗∗ -3.58
(5.09) (2.60)
Elected in local elections 3.91 -4.68 -3.64 -3.51
(3.64) (5.17) (1.91) (2.11)
Media Exposure -0.0045 -0.0055 0.0091 -0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.014) (0.0023)
Constant 12.1∗∗ 19.7∗∗∗ 40.1∗∗∗ 17.7∗∗∗
(5.11) (6.36) (7.36) (4.24)
N 40 22 13 40
R2 0.4727 0.4142 0.6192 0.3527
R¯2 0.3366 0.1213 0.2383 0.1856
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust standard errors. College is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official had at least finished college.
Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is a man. Candidate variables count how many times the
official was a candidate in the past and Elected count how many times an official was elected in the past. Media
Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the
day of the election.
Table 2.6: Estimation of Order against personal characteristics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Order 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗
(0.000013) (0.000013) (0.000013) (0.000057) (0.000056) (0.000059)
Column 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.000329) (0.000329) (0.000349) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Column × Order -0.00084∗∗∗ -0.00084∗∗∗ -0.00077∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0048∗∗∗
(0.000012) (0.000012) (0.000013) (0.000062) (0.000062) (0.000066)
Mayor -0.061∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗
(0.00037) (0.00037) (0.00099) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0057)
Castan˜eda -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.000126) (0.000125) (0.00022) (0.00057) (0.00058) (0.0011)
Right Party 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.000098) (0.000097) (0.00020) (0.00040) (0.00040) (0.00046)
Minor Parties 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗
(0.000127) (0.000126) (0.00039) 0.00055) (0.00054) (0.0014)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.031∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.00133) (0.0047)
College -0.00071∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗
(0.000039) (0.00020)
Age 0.0000076∗∗∗ 0.000034∗∗∗
(0.0000013) (0.0000062)
Gender 0.00014∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗
(0.000029) (0.00014)
Candidate in national elections -0.000023 -0.00049∗∗
(0.000021) (0.00011)
Candidate in local elections -0.000020 0.00053∗∗
(0.000029) (0.00013)
Elected in national elections -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗
(0.000095) (0.00041)
Elected in local elections -0.00021∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗
(000032) (0.00014)
Media Exposure -0.000029∗∗∗ -0.00019∗∗∗
(0.0000009) (0.0000050)
Constant 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗ -1.31∗∗∗
(0.00069) (0.00026) (0.00048) (0.0042) (0.00093) (0.0019)
FE No Center Center No Center Center
Method LS LS LS Probit Probit Probit
N 1451215 1451215 1451215 2902430 2902430 2902430
R2 0.2354 0.3868 0.3882
R¯2 0.2354 0.3864 0.3879
Log-Likelihood 2237147.2 2397277.3 2398980.3 -76153626.0 -75668239.8 -75667520.4
∆R2 0.0282 0.0282 0.017
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions are clustered at the Center level. Minor Parties is a dummy that takes value 1 if the official
belonged neither to the party of the Mayor neither to the right-wing coalition. College is a dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the official had at least finished college. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is a
man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share that the party’s official obtained in the 2010 elections in a district.
Candidate variables count how many times the official was a candidate in the past and Elected count how many
times an official was elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the
leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election. ∆R2 shows the difference in R2 between
the full model and a restricted model without Order, Column and Column× Order.
Table 2.7: Estimations of blank share votes by table
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Order 0.0040 College 0.00001
Column 0.0031 Age 0.00001
Column × Order 0.0004 Gender 0.00001
Mayor 0.0001 Candidate in national elections 0.00000
Castan˜eda 0.00001 Candidate in local elections 0.00000
Right Party 0.0001 Elected in national elections 0.00001
Minor Parties 0.0001 Elected in local elections 0.00000
Party Share in 2010 elections 0.0013 Media Exposure 0.00001
Table 2.8: Squares of Semi-partial correlation Coefficients
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No Share No Share No Share
Order -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0092∗∗∗
(0.000073) (0.000072) (0.000076)
Column -0.29∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Column × Order 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
(0.000082) (0.000082) (0.000087)
Mayor 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0077)
Castan˜eda -0.036∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0022)
Right Party -0.019∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.00076) (0.00074) (0.00065)
Minor Parties -0.017 -0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.00083) (0.00081) (0.0024)
Party Share in 2010 elections 0.11∗∗∗
(0.0077)
College 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.00026)
Age -0.000079∗∗∗
(0.0000083)
Gender -0.0023∗∗∗
(0.00020)
Candidate in national elections 0.00051∗∗∗
(0.00014)
Candidate in local elections -0.0013∗∗∗
(0.00017)
Elected in national elections 0.00035
(0.00060)
Elected in local elections 0.0025∗∗∗
(0.00019)
Media Exposure 0.00025∗∗∗
(0.0000069)
Constant 1.16∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.011) (0.011)
Yes Share Yes Share Yes Share
Order -0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0093∗∗∗
(0.000073) (0.000072) (0.000077)
Column -0.31∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Column × Order 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.000083) (0.000083) (0.000090)
Mayor 0.69∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0073)
Castan˜eda 0.080∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Right Party -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.00077) (0.00079) (0.00080)
Minor Parties -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.00087) (0.00088) (0.0033)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.037∗∗∗
(0.010)
College 0.0041∗∗∗
(0.00027)
Age -0.0000047
(0.0000088)
Gender 0.00066∗∗∗
(0.00019)
Candidate in national elections 0.00075∗∗∗
(0.00015)
Candidate in local elections -0.000068
(0.00018)
Elected in national elections 0.0075∗∗∗
(0.00065)
Elected in local elections 0.00041∗∗
(0.00020)
Media Exposure 0.00023∗∗∗
(0.0000064)
Constant 1.19∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.010) (0.011)
FE No District District
N 4353645 4353645 4353645
Log-Likelihood -199726345.0 -198379308.7 -198375258.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions are clustered at the Center level. Minor Parties is a dummy that takes value 1 if the official
belonged neither to the party of the Mayor neither to the right-wing coalition. College is a dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the official had at least finished college. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is a
man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share that the party’s official obtained in the 2010 elections in a district.
Candidate variables count how many times the official was a candidate in the past and Elected count how many
times an official was elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in the
leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the election.
Table 2.9: Multinomial Probit estimations of structural model at the City
Level
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Villa El Salvador San Isidro
No Share No Share
Order -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0080∗∗∗
(0.00087) (0.00039)
Column -0.30∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013)
Column × Order 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(0.00090) (0.00057)
Mayor 0.54∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051)
Castan˜eda -0.040∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0096)
Right Party -0.020∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗
(0.0051) (0.054)
Minor Parties -0.0073 0.083 ∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.020)
Party Share in 2010 elections 0.021 0.35∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.12)
College 0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0013)
Age -0.00014∗∗∗ -0.000066∗∗
(0.000045) (0.000028)
Gender -0.00011 -0.0094∗∗∗
(0.00091) (0.00066)
Candidate in national elections 0.0011∗ -0.0010
(0.00068) (0.0011)
Candidate in local elections -0.0013∗ 0.0010
(0.00077) (0.0014)
Elected in national elections -0.0024 0.033∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0040)
Elected in local elections 0.0019∗∗∗ -0.00065
(0.00068) (0.0014)
Media Exposure 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00062∗∗∗
(0.000032) (0.000046)
Constant 1.05∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Yes Share Yes Share
Order -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0090∗∗∗
(0.00092) (0.00039)
Column -0.32∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.012)
Column × Order 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.00097) (0.00055)
Mayor 0.50∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.048)
Castan˜eda 0.0027 0.15∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.013)
Right Party -0.028∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.079)
Minor Parties -0.025∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.031)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.023 -0.84 ∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.18)
College 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0014
(0.0019) (0.0018)
Age -0.00016∗∗∗ 0.000046
(0.000049) (0.000040)
Gender 0.0016∗ -0.0046∗∗∗
(0.00084) (0.0012)
Candidate in national elections 0.00090 -0.000054
(0.00071) (0.00100)
Candidate in local elections -0.00045 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.00091) (0.0016)
Elected in national elections 0.0035∗ 0.0052
(0.0020) (0.0036)
Elected in local elections 0.0013 0.000083
(0.00083) (0.0017)
Media Exposure 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00044∗∗∗
(0.000030) (0.000038)
Constant 1.16∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.039)
N 181416 47757
Log-Likelihood -9138692.5 -1879681.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All regressions are clustered at the Center level. Minor Parties is
a dummy that takes value 1 if the official belonged neither to the
party of the Mayor neither to the right-wing coalition. College is a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official had at least finished
college. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the official is a man.
Party share in 2010 elections is the share that the party’s official
obtained in the 2010 elections in a district. Candidate variables
count how many times the official was a candidate in the past and
Elected count how many times an official was elected in the past.
Media Exposure is the total number the official was mentioned in
the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until the day of the
election.
Table 2.10: Multinomial Probit estimations of structural model for Villa El
Salvador and San Isidro
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(1) (2)
Order 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.000047) (0.0000083)
Column 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.00028)
Column × Order -0.00077∗∗∗ -0.00077∗∗∗
(0.000059) (0.000012)
Mayor -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.00095)
Castaneda 0.0026 0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.00021)
Right Party 0.0044∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.000095)
Minor Parties -0.0051∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.00025)
Party Share in 2010 elections -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.00083)
College -0.00071 -0.00070∗∗∗
(0.00065) (0.000037)
Age 0.0000076 0.0000071∗∗∗
(0.000013) (0.0000013)
Gender 0.00014 0.00014∗∗∗
(0.00030) (0.000026)
Candidate in national elections -0.000023 -0.000019
(0.00019) (0.000021)
Candidate in local elections -0.000020 -0.000029
(0.00023) (0.000026)
Elected in national elections -0.0015∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.00064) (0.000078)
Elected in local elections -0.00021 -0.00020∗∗∗
(0.00025) (0.000028)
Media Exposure -0.000029∗∗∗ -0.000030∗∗∗
(0.0000090) (0.00000092)
Constant 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.00030)
FE Center Booth
Clustering Center× Order (multiway) Booth
N 1451215 1451215
R2 0.39 0.88
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
College is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the official had at
least finished college. Minor Parties is a dummy that takes value
1 if the official belonged neither to the party of the Mayor neither
to the right-wing coalition. Gender is a dummy taking the value 1
if the official is a man. Party share in 2010 elections is the share
that the party’s official obtained in the 2010 elections in a district.
Candidate variables count how many times the official was a candi-
date in the past and Elected count how many times an official was
elected in the past. Media Exposure is the total number the official
was mentioned in the leading Peruvian newspapers from 2010 until
the day of the election.
Table 2.11: Blank Share of Votes: Additional Robustness Checks.
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Chapter 3
Costly voting under
complete information
Pivotal voter models with costly voting started under complete information
with the seminal contribution of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) (henceforth,
PR), where two groups of individuals each preferring one of two alterna-
tives simultaneously decide between abstaining or voting for their preferred
alternative. The winner is decided by majority rule. Technical difficulties
and multiplicity issues allowed them to analyze only special cases.1 Two
years later, the same authors proposed in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) to
drop the assumption of complete information, and from then onwards the
literature has almost exclusively focused on private information on the cost
of voting. Some of the most relevant contributions which analyze private-
information costly-voting pivotal voter models are Campbel (1999), Bo¨rgers
(2004), Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), and Taylor and Yildirim (2010).2
1In particular, PR’s setting is one of identical individual benefits from winning across
groups, and they analyze: i) identical group sizes and symmetry of strategies across groups,
and ii) aggregate probabilities of voting across individuals of different groups summing to
1. Besides these special cases of our analysis, they also analyze two different settings: one
where there is a status quo (ties are broken in favor of one group, instead of randomly), and
one, namely “k equilibria”, where individuals of one group mix with identical probability,
whereas among the individuals of the other group, k vote with probability 1 and the
remaining with probability 0.
2Another way to exploit private information to simplify the analysis is provided in
Myerson (1998a) (and also in Myerson (1998b) and Myerson (2000)). He suggests an
alternative model in which the size of the electorate is a Poisson random variable. As
Krishna and Morgan (2012) claim, Myerson’s approach “has the important advantage of
considerably simplifying the analysis of pivotal events”. In Myerson’s games, citizens’
preferences are determined via a privately observed stochastic draw.
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We believe the complete information setting also deserves attention, hence
the goal of this paper is to complement the existing private information
literature, and to move the PR analysis a step forward.
The literature has shown that assuming private information on the cost
of voting typically has technical advantages. In particular the equilibrium
is unique and the strategies are completely characterized by a single cut-off
value: supporters of A (B) vote if and only if the cost of voting is lower
than a threshold cA (cB).
3 As PR showed, uniqueness and cut-off strategies
are not generally present in models of complete information. Nevertheless,
we first show that, if the cost of voting is sufficiently high at least for the
supporters of one of the two alternatives, the equilibrium is unique. We
fully characterize it. If instead the cost of voting is sufficiently low for all
individuals, we characterize three classes of equilibria, and show that any
equilibrium must belong to one of these three classes, regardless of the num-
ber of individuals. Furthermore, we propose a novel equilibrium refinement
that always singles out a unique equilibrium. This refinement says that the
equilibrium probability of voting is continuous in the cost of voting. In fact,
it would be hard to claim that negligible changes in the cost of voting could
bring about drastic changes in the probabilities of voting. For example, if the
voting center station moves slightly away from the home of an individual,
her probability of voting also changes negligibly. The unique equilibrium
pinned down by the continuity refinement is proved to belong always to the
same class of equilibria out of the three classes previously characterized.
The features of the equilibrium that we analyze are as follows. First of all,
we find a turnout upper-bound: the sum of the equilibrium probabilities
of voting of an m-individual and an n-individual is less than 1. Moreover,
members of the majority group with higher cost-to-benefit ratio have higher
probability of being pivotal in equilibrium, and thus –intuitively– vote with
a higher probability in equilibrium. This carries over even if the two groups
are asymmetric only in the cost-to-benefit ratio and symmetric in size. If in-
stead the two groups are symmetric in cost-to-benefit ratio and asymmetric
in size, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probabil-
ity than those in the majority do. This latter result already exists in models
of private information on the cost of voting, see Taylor and Yildirim (2010).
The fact that members of the minority vote more than members of the ma-
jority is called the “underdog effect”.4 However, we find that if the minority
3Note that all papers cited in the main text of the previous paragraph assume private
information and have only equilibria in cut-off strategies, but PR (83).
4Laboratory experiments confirm the underdog effect, see Levine, D., Palfrey, T., 2007.
The paradox of voter participation? A laboratory study. Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 101 (1),
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has a sufficiently higher cost-to-benefit ratio than the majority, the under-
dog effect disappears (i.e., the members of the minority group votes with
lower probability than members of the majority group). This result is trivial
per se (infinite cost-to-benefit ratio yields necessary 0 probability of voting)
unless something is said about the asymmetry in cost-to-benefit needed to
break the underdog effect: we show that if the ratio of cost-to-benefit ratios
is greater than the number of members of the minority then the underdog
effect is contradicted and the members of the minority group vote with 0
probability regardless of their (strictly positive) cost-to-benefit ratio. We
furthermore perform comparative statics in the number of individuals, and
give the intuition behind it, along with the construction of the equilibrium
itself.
Our complete information setting springs from PR, however we depart
from them in that an individual’s benefit of having the favorite alterna-
tive win can be asymmetric according to whether the individual supports
one or the other alternative, meaning that the personal benefit can differ
between individuals supporting one alternative or the other. Our general-
ization of PR to asymmetric benefits is natural especially when the group
sizes are asymmetric. For instance, think of an economics department con-
sisting of several microeconomists and a few macroeconomists, all called
to vote over who to hire between two job market candidates: a microe-
conomist and a macroeconomist.5 Both types of economists are better-off
if the newly hired candidate is of their same type. Furthermore, the ben-
efit for a macroeconomist from hiring another macroeconomist is greater
than the one for a microeconomist from hiring a microeconomist because of
the asymmetric size of the two groups; that is, since macroeconomists are
fewer, having another macroeconomist in the department sharply increases
each macroeconomist’s coauthoring possibilities, whereas the benefit for a
microeconomist from having a new microeconomist in the department is
lower because they are already plenty. In other words, the benefit is asym-
metric across individuals of different groups. This asymmetry gives rise to
asymmetric willingness to vote.6
1431 58.
5The cost of voting in this case is the opportunity cost of showing up to vote that day
instead of, for example, being on vacation.
6Another example of asymmetric benefit across groups is the following. Residents of
two neighborhoods are called to vote over the location of a new school in one of the two
neighborhoods. In neighborhood 1 there is already a school, in neighborhood 2 there is
none: thus, despite the fact that each resident strictly prefers the school to be located in
her neighborhood, residents in neighborhood 1 care less than residents in neighborhood 2
about the location of the school since there is already a school in neighborhood 1.
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3.1 Model
Consider a complete information setting where there are two groups of indi-
viduals of size m and n, with m,n ∈ N+. Throughout the paper we assume
m > n > 1: the analysis of n = 1 is ruled out to avoid dealing with triv-
ial cases, and the analysis of m = n produces peculiar results and is left
to Appendix C. We use sub-index i ∈ {m,n} to identify the group with a
slight abuse of notation. The individuals are called to cast a vote between
two alternatives, M and N . An individual of group m prefers alternative
M , and an individual of group n prefers alternative N . That is, if M wins,
the payoff of an individual m increases by ∆pim ∈ R++, and similarly by
∆pin ∈ R++ for individuals n if N wins. Individuals choose whether to
vote for their preferred alternative or to abstain, since voting for the non-
preferred alternative is strictly dominated. If an individual casts a vote, she
faces a group-specific cost of voting, ci ∈ R++. Thus, the increase in payoff
–net of cost of voting– for an individual i when her preferred policy wins is
∆pii − ci if she voted, and ∆pii if she did not vote. Individuals vote simul-
taneously and the winning alternative is decided by majority rule. Ties are
broken by a fair coin toss.
Each individual i chooses her probability of voting, denoted by pi, that
maximizes her expected payoff, given the choices of all other individuals. We
consider Quasi-Symmetric Nash Equilibria (QSNE), that is, individuals of
group i follow the same equilibrium strategy p∗i . Besides being used in PR,
the assumption of QSNE has been used in private-information pivotal-voter
models to obtain that individuals adopt cut-off strategies. See for instance
Bo¨rgers (2004) and Taylor and Yildirim (2010).
In a QSNE a pair (p∗i , p
∗
j ) is an equilibrium if an individual of group
i ∈ {m,n} would not want to deviate from p∗i if she expects every other
individual of group i to also play p∗i and all individuals of group j with j 6= i
to play p∗j . A QSNE can be of one of the following three types:
1. “Pure-Pure”: (p∗m, p∗n) ∈ {0, 1}2
2. “Pure-Mix”: p∗m ∈ {0, 1}, p∗n ∈ (0, 1) or p∗m ∈ (0, 1), p∗n ∈ {0, 1}
3. “Mix-Mix”: (p∗m, p∗n) ∈ (0, 1)2.
Define Ai to be the probability that the vote of an individual of group i
is pivotal. An individual of group i will cast a vote if:
Ai∆pii ≥ ci
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or
Ai ≥ ci
∆pii
≡ Bi (3.1)
for i ∈ {m,n}. The probabilities of being pivotal are defined as follows:7
Ai =
n∑
s=0
(
i− 1
s
)(
j
s
)
psi (1−pi)i−s−1psj(1−pj)j−s+
n−1∑
s=0
(
i− 1
s
)(
j
s+ 1
)
psi (1−pi)i−s−1ps+1j (1−pj)j−s−1
(3.2)
for i, j ∈ {m,n}, i 6= j.
We now explain how the expression (3.2) is constructed. A single indi-
vidual m, who computes her probability of being pivotal, takes as given the
probabilities of voting (pm, pn) of all other individuals. The individual m
is pivotal when her vote either breaks a tie, or when it creates one. In (3.2)
the first summation is her probability of breaking a tie, and the second of
creating a tie. She can break a tie with her vote, if the number of individuals
that vote for m equals the number of individuals that vote for n. Call this
number s. Out of m−1 other m-individuals, exactly s vote with probability(
m−1
s
)
psm(1− pm)m−s−1. On the other hand, out of n n-individuals, exactly
s vote with probability
(
n
s
)
psn(1 − pn)n−s. The second summation of (3.2)
is similarly constructed: individual m can create a tie with her vote, if the
number of individuals that vote for m, (which is again called s), is one less
than the number of individuals that vote for n.
3.2 Computing the equilibria
In this section we compute the QSNE of the voting game, given the relative
costs of voting Bi and Bj , and classify them according to their type: “Pure-
Pure”, “Pure-Mix” or “Mix-Mix”. We start with the first two types, ie.
equilibria in which some individuals have pure strategies.
3.2.1 “Pure-Pure” and ”Pure-Mix” equilibria
If Ai < Bi or Ai > Bi, then individual i’s dominant strategy is to abstain
or to vote, respectively (i.e. pure strategy). Whereas when Ai = Bi, i is
indifferent between voting and not (i.e. mixed strategy). Bi is therefore the
minimum probability of being pivotal such that an individual i will vote.
7Note that they already take into account that within groups individuals vote with the
same probability.
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For that reason, an individual i whose Bi is greater than 1 does not vote in
equilibrium.8 We formalize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If Bi ≥ 1 then p∗i = 0.
Proof. Let p∗i > 0. First, if Bi > 1, by (3.1) we have Ai > 1, which is a
contradiction, since Ai is a probability. Second, if Bi = 1, by (3.1) we have
Ai = 1. Then, we cannot have p
∗
i ∈ (0, 1) because of the following: if all
individuals are randomizing between voting and not, then they cannot be
pivotal with certainty, so Ai 6= 1 leading to a contradiction. Therefore we
only need to rule out Bi = p
∗
i = 1. For this we need to distinguish the
following cases.
Case 1. If p∗m = 1 all m individuals vote, which means that they win
regardless of p∗n because they are the largest group. But then, no n individual
would want to face the cost of voting, p∗n = 0. Thus, for a single m-individual
deviation to pm = 0 is profitable, leading to a contradiction.
Case 2. If p∗n = 1 then in order to sustain An = 1 the n individuals must
be certain that either n or n − 1 of the m individuals vote. However, this
can happen neither if p∗m ∈ (0, 1) nor if p∗m = {0, 1} (because this would
imply m or 0 votes cast by group m). Thus, we reach a contradiction.
The previous lemma shows that if relative costs of voting are high enough
for individuals of both groups, the only equilibrium that exists is the “Pure-
Pure” one in which nobody votes.
Obviously, the situation described in Lemma 1 is not very interesting.
Therefore, next we allow one of the two relative costs of voting to be low
enough such that individuals from one of the two groups might consider
voting, in other words Bi ≥ 1 only for individuals i. Then Lemma 2 yields
a simple and unique characterization of j’s equilibrium strategy:
Lemma 2. (“Pure-Mix”) For Bi ≥ 1 and Bj ∈ (0, 1) the unique QSNE is
that p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 1−B
1
j−1
j , for all i, j ∈ {m,n}, i 6= j.9
Proof. By Lemma 1, p∗i = 0. Suppose p
∗
j = 0. Then any single j individual
would have an incentive to deviate and vote for sure in order to single-
handedly decide the election in favor of the j-group. Thus pj = 0 is not an
8If the cost of voting for i is greater than the benefit of winning with certainty of being
pivotal, in the unique equilibrium no member of i will vote (that is, ci > ∆pii contradicts
Ai ∈ [0, 1]).
9As a reminder, in the beginning of this section we have assumed m > n > 1. It is
easy to see that for j = 1 the unique equilibrium is: p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 1
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equilibrium. On the other hand, suppose p∗j = 1. This means that j group
wins for sure with a margin of j votes. Then any single j-individual would
have an incentive not to pay the cost without affecting the outcome. Thus
pj = 1 is not an equilibrium. Therefore p
∗
j ∈ (0, 1). Plugging p∗i = 0 in
Aj we have Aj = (1 − pj)j−1, and since (3.1) must hold with equality for
individuals j to mix, we have:
(1− pj)j−1 = Bj
or equivalently:
pj = 1−B
1
j−1
j .
For x ∈ (0, 1) the expression 1−x 1j−1 is strictly decreasing in x. Therefore
p∗j = 1 − B
1
j−1
j is strictly decreasing in cj and strictly increasing in ∆pij .
Higher individual cost-payoff ratio results in j-individuals voting with lower
probability.
The two previous Lemmas examine cases in which individuals from at
least one group find it too costly to vote, not matter what individuals from
the other group are doing. These two cases gave rise to two types of equilibria
“Pure-Pure” in which everybody’s strictly dominant strategy is to not vote
(Lemma 1), and “Pure-Mix” in which individuals from one group have a
strictly dominant strategy to not vote and individuals from the other group
mix (Lemma 2).
We examine next what happens when individuals from neither group
have a strictly dominant strategy to abstain, ie. what happens when Bm <
1 and Bn < 1. Under these conditions individuals of both groups may
vote with positive probability. This causes strategic interactions that may
generate multiple equilibria.
It is easy to see that when Bm < 1 and Bn < 1 no “Pure-Pure” equilibria
exist.
Lemma 3. For Bi < 1 and Bj < 1, no “Pure-Pure” QSNE exist, for all
i, j ∈ {m,n} and i 6= j.
Proof. Assume p∗i = 0. Then p
∗
j = 0 cannot be a QSNE because Aj = 1
so deviation to voting for a j individual would be profitable. Also pj = 1
cannot be a QSNE because a j-individual deviating to pj = 0 would not
affect the outcome of the election and save her cost of voting.
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The only case left to analyze is p∗m = p∗n = 1. The n individuals lose for
sure, and thus they would be better-off not to vote.
After proving that for Bm < 1 and Bn < 1 no “Pure-Pure” equilibria
exist, the next lemma establishes that for Bm < 1 and Bn < 1 a “Pure-Mix”
equilibrium does exist. First, we need to define Bi = jBj − (j − 1)B
j
j−1
j
Lemma 4. For Bi < 1 and Bj < 1, there exists a “Pure-Mix” QSNE with
p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 1 − B
1
j−1
j , for all i, j ∈ {m,n} and i 6= j if and only if
Bi ≥ Bi.
Proof. An equilibrium where p∗i = 0 implies: Aj = (1−pj)j−1 and Ai = (1−
pj)
j+jpj(1−pj)j−1. The former means that an individual j is pivotal only if
none of her groupmates vote (her vote breaks the tie in which nobody votes).
The latter means that an individual i is pivotal if none of j individuals vote
or if only one of them votes. In order for the i-individuals to not want to
vote we must have:
Ai ≤ Bi,
or equivalently
(1− pj)j + jpj(1− pj)j−1 ≤ Bi,
and similarly, for the j-group individual to mix we must have:
(1− pj)j−1 = Bj , (3.3)
dividing the two conditions and rearranging we get:
1− pj + jpj ≤ Bi
Bj
(j − 1)pj ≤ Bi
Bj
− 1 (3.4)
Isolate pj in (3.3) and plug it in (3.4) to get
(j − 1)
(
1−B
1
j−1
j
)
≤ Bi
Bj
− 1 (3.5)
Or equivalently,
−B
j
j−1
j ≤
Bi − jBj
j − 1 (3.6)
Bi ≥ jBj − (j − 1)B
j
j−1
j ≡ Bi
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Bi is an increasing bijection from [0, 1] to [0, 1], such that if Bj = 0,
Bi = 0, and if Bj = 1, Bi = 1.
Note that the equilibria pinned down by Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 are
essentially the same, the difference being that Lemma 2 provides the range
of Bi’s for which the equilibrium is unique, and Lemma 4 provides the range
of Bi’s for which that equilibrium continues to exist although not necessarily
uniquely. This is an important finding that we will discuss further in the
next section where we analyze our continuity refinement.
Lemma 4 is silent with respect to which of the two groups will be mixing
and which will not be voting. What it says is that if Bm < 1 and Bn < 1 it
can be either that the m individuals do not vote and the n individuals mix,
or that the n individuals do not vote and the m individuals mix. The next
lemma shows that for a given pair (Bi, Bj) these two “Pure-Mix” equilibria
of Lemma 4 cannot co-exist.10
Lemma 5. For Bi < 1 and Bj < 1, Bi ≥ Bi and Bj ≥ Bj are mutually
exclusive, for all i, j ∈ {m,n} and i 6= j.
Proof. Suppose not and consider the (Bi, Bj)−space. We first show that
Bi > Bj , or equivalently:
(j − 1)Bj > (j − 1)B
j
j−1
j
1 > B
1
j−1
j .
For the same reason we also have Bj > Bi. Then, Bi ≥ Bi and Bi > Bj
imply Bi > Bj , while Bj ≥ Bj and Bj > Bi imply Bj > Bi leading to a
contradiction.
3.2.2 “Mix-Mix” equilibria
Lemmas 1 to 5 completely characterized the “Pure-Pure” and “Pure-Mix”
equilibria of our voting game. We are left to analyze the “Mix-Mix” equi-
libria. Obviously, in any “Mix-Mix” equilibrium the voting conditions (3.1)
for the two groups hold with equality. That is, the best reply under mixing
for the m individuals is defined by:
Am = Bm (3.7)
10Meaning that for a given pair (Bi, Bj) we either have m individuals not voting and n
mixing or n individuals not voting and m mixing (but not both).
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and the best reply under mixing for the n individuals is defined by:
An = Bn (3.8)
Since we have imposed the condition that all individuals within a group
employ the same strategy, it suffices to focus on the mixing condition of a
single m and on that of a a single n individual and analyze the intersections
between these two in the (pm, pn)-space. These intersections are “Mix-Mix”
equilibrium pairs (p∗m, p∗n), which are what we are after in this Subsection.
In contrast with the “Pure-Pure” and “Pure-Mix” cases, the “Mix-Mix”
case entails solving a system of two polynomial equations of arbitrary power
–expressions (3.7) and (3.8)–, and thus there is no general algebraic solution
for equilibrium strategies (by the Abel-Ruffini theorem which states that
there is no general algebraic solution to polynomial equations of degree five
or higher with arbitrary coefficients). Instead, in order to analyze them we
will use a number of indirect results about the space these equilibria lie
on. For this it is useful to distinguish among the three cases: Bm = Bn,
Bm > Bn, and Bm < Bn. Thus, by (3.7) and (3.8), these translate into
Am = An, Am > An, and Am < An. Analyzing Am = An will greatly help
the analysis of the other two cases.
The set of points for which Am = An is depicted by the two black lines
of Figure 3.1; the increasing and the decreasing one. These two black lines
divide the (pm, pn)-space in four regions depending on the ranking of Am
and An. Keep in mind that the two mixing conditions are defined in the
same space; dividing the space in these four regions will help us analyze how
the intersections of the two mixing conditions behave.11
In Appendix A we characterize the set Am = An, through a series of
lemmas. First, we find the four points where these two lines touch the edges
of the (pm, pn)-space (Lemma 6). Second, we characterize the decreasing
line connecting the top-left corner with the bottom-right corner (Lemma
7). Finally we characterize the increasing line (Lemmas 8 and 9).12 We
summarize this series of lemmas in Proposition 6.
11At this stage it is interesting to compare our analysis with the one of PR. In particular
in Section 6 of PR, they discuss “totally quasi-symmetric equilibria”, which are what we
call “Mix-Mix” equilibria. However they analyze two special cases, which in our notation
are: i) pm = pn and m = n and ii) pm + pn = 1. In terms of our Figure 3.1 it means
that they analyze equilibria that might arise along the two diagonals (in the case of the
45-degree line, they also assume m = n).
12Note that, as it will be explained in more detail later, the fact that the increasing line
is in fact increasing is not needed. What is only needed is that it crosses the decreasing
line once.
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Figure 3.1: Set of points in the (pm, pn)-space according to whetherAm R An
when m = 3 and n = 2.
Proposition 6. The only points (pm, pn) ∈ (0, 1)2 satisfying condition
Am = An (3.9)
are the points along the line pm + pn = 1 and along a continuous line
that goes from (0, 0) to (p∗∗∗m , 1) where p∗∗∗m =
n(n−1)
n(n−1)+
√
n(n−1)(m−n)(m−n+1) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The two lines that we have characterized divide the (pm, pn)-space in
four regions: two where Am > An and two where Am < An. Since we
are examining “Mix-Mix” equilibria, these two inequalities directly translate
into conditions on Bm and Bn that must be satisfied in “Mix-Mix” equilibria
(see (3.7) and (3.8)). Thus when Bm > Bn all equilibria lie in one of the
two regions where Am > An, and when Bm < Bn all equilibria lie in one of
the two regions where Am < An.
What we prove next (see Appendix B) is that the two mixing conditions
cross at most once in each of the four regions delimited by the set of points
such that Am = An (see Figure 3.1). This implies that we always have at
most two “Mix-Mix” equilibria, one where p∗m+p∗n < 1 which we name “Mix-
Mix 1”, and one where p∗m+p∗n > 1 which we name “Mix-Mix 2”. Including
the “Pure-Mix” equilibrium (Lemma 4 characterizes it and Lemma 5 proves
it is unique), this shows that we have at most three equilibria. Hence, we
prove the following:
Theorem 4. If Bi > Bi for individuals of both groups i ∈ {m,n}, there
exists a unique QSNE such that p∗m = p∗n = 0.
If Bi > Bi and Bj ≤ Bj with i ∈ {m,n} and i 6= j there exists a unique
QSNE such that p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 1−B
1
j−1
j .
If Bi ≤ Bi for all i ∈ {m,n}, there are at most three QSNE, one ”Pure-
Mix” and two “Mix-Mix” ones.
Proof. The first statement follows from Lemma 1. The second statement
follows from Lemmas 2 to 5. The third statement is proved in Appendix
B.
Theorem 4 concludes the first part of the paper, establishing that there
are at most three equilibria. Returning to PR, the analysis that they carry
out for two special cases makes them “[...] conjecture that the class of all
totally quasi-symmetric equilibria is much larger than those we have been
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able to investigate.”13 However, we showed that this class of equilibria –
which we call “Mix-Mix”– admits, at most, two equilibria.
What we do in the next Section is propose a refinement and show that
this refinement always pins down a unique equilibrium. We first deliver the
intuition on how the continuity refinement works by means of a numerical
example.
3.3 Continuous Refinement and Uniqueness
In this section we consider the simplest non-trivial example: m = 3 and
n = 2. We compute and depict the three equilibria and give the intuition how
the continuity refinement pins down a unique equilibrium. All qualitative
features of this numerical example hold for any m and n.
For the sake of the numerical example, we fix ∆pim =
n
m∆pin. This
parametrization complies with the application we discuss in Section 5 but
it also has a simple interpretation: the individual gain of winning of an
individual belonging to the big group m, is smaller than the individual gain
of an individual of group n. Moreover, how smaller is governed by the ratio of
the two group sizes. This implies that we can write Bn = B and Bm =
m
nB,
and thus we have only one parameter B simplifying the exposition greatly.
For any B we examine all the types of equilibria: “Pure-Pure”, “Mix-
Mix”, and “Pure-Mix”. We find that for low B there are three different
types of equilibria, which are depicted in the first row of Figure 3.2, while
for larger B we only have the equilibrium depicted in the second row. In
fact the unique equilibrium for B sufficiently large corresponds to the char-
acterization in Lemmas 1 to 5.
Now, take for example B = 1/3 and consider Figure 3.2. There are
three different equilibria we can have: two equilibria where both types of
individuals are mixing (“Mix-Mix 1” and “Mix-Mix 2”) and one where the
n individuals vote for sure and the m individuals mix. This last equilibrium
is of the form “Pure-Mix”. However, it involves individuals from one group
voting with certainty, and thus it is in sharp contrast with the equilibrium
characterized in Lemmas 1 to 5, where individuals from one group do not
vote. Since this equilibrium will be ruled out by our continuity refinement,
throughout the rest of the paper we refer to “Pure-Mix” as the one charac-
terized in Lemmas 1 to 5 (with p∗i = 0). These three equilibria correspond
to Theorem 4. On the other hand for larger (but not too large) B, say
B ∈ (2/3, 1), there is only one type of equilibrium, the one where the n
13PR, page 10.
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Figure 3.2: First row, first panel: “Mix-Mix 1”. First row, second panel:
“Mix-Mix 2”. Second row: “High B” equilibrium.
individuals are mixing, and the m individuals are abstaining for sure (note
that in this case Bm < 1 < Bn). And naturally, for B ≥ 1, no-one votes.
These two last cases are the “High B” equilibrium in Figure 3.2 which is
composed of the “Pure-Pure” equilibrium of Lemma 1 and the “Pure-Mix”
equilibrium of Lemmas 1 to 5.
Starting from sufficiently high B we have to be in the “High B” equi-
librium. As we keep decreasing B, at some point we need to switch to
one (or more) equilibria from the first row of Figure 3.2. However the only
equilibrium out of the three that involves no jumps in the probabilities of
voting, is the “Mix-Mix 1” equilibrium. We show that this continuous equi-
librium (depicted in Figure 3.2) exists and is unique for all (m,n) and for
all (Bi, Bj).
The “Mix-Mix 1” and “Mix-Mix 2” equilibria can also be seen in the
mixing condition graphs depicted in Figure 3.4 in the (pm, pn)-space. The
red (blue) lines represent the mixing condition for a n (m) individual for four
values of B, {0.166, 0.333, 0.5, 0.61}. In particular, we chose the third value
to be the minimum B such that the “Mix-Mix 1” equilibrium disappears
(bottom-left panel), and the fourth value to be the minimum B such that
even the ”Mix-Mix 2” equilibrium disappears. The black lines in Figure 3.4
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Figure 3.3: Unique continuous equilibrium
are the set of (pm, pn) satisfying Am = An as in Figure 3.1.
In each panel, the equilibrium on the left side of the panel is the “Mix-
Mix 1” equilibrium. It converges to the “Pure-Mix” equilibrium (p∗m, p∗n) =
(0, 0.5) as B → 0.5. The equilibrium that lays on the right side of the panel
is the “Mix-Mix 2” equilibrium.
We use a standard definition of continuity (see for example page 943 of
Mas-Colell et al (1995)). This definition means that, for all i, j ∈ {m,n}, i 6=
j, there is a single continuous selection of the equilibrium correspondences
p∗i (Bi, Bj) mapping (Bi, Bj) to equilibrium probabilities of voting.
Which of the three equilibria together with the “High B” unique equi-
librium satisfies continuity? First, notice that the three equilibria need that
Bm, Bn < 1. This means that we can focus on the part of the “High B”
equilibrium that is defined for Bm, Bn < 1 as well. Hence, we need to find
among the three equilibria the one for which p∗i goes to 0 and at the same
time, p∗j is interior.
14 For this to happen we need that p∗m + p∗n < 1, which
contradicts the third equilibrium in Figure 3.2 because this equilibrium re-
quires that one of the two p∗i ’s is equal to one. Out of the two “Mix-Mix”
equilibria, “Mix-Mix 2” contradicts p∗m + p∗n < 1.
Therefore we are left with only one candidate, namely “Mix-Mix 1”, that
together with “High B” equilibrium, might satisfy continuity. First notice
that Lemma 4 gives us for every Bj ∈ (0, 1) the lowest Bi for existence of
the “Pure-Mix” equilibrium p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 1 − B
1
j−1
j . This satisfies the
system Ai ≤ Bi and Aj = Bj , which implies that the system Ai = Bi and
Aj = Bj is also satisfied (Ai’s are continuous in pi’s).
14In terms of Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.4, equilibria must converge to the horizontal or
vertical axis. This happens in the third panel of Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Mixing conditions in the (pm, pn)-space respectively for B =
{0.1666, 0.3333, 0.5, 0.61}.
Thus we proved the following:
Theorem 5. There exists a unique pair (p∗m, p∗n) such that continuity holds
at all (Bm, Bn) ∈ R2++, and it is composed of “Mix-Mix 1” and “High B”.
3.4 Application - voting over redistribution of wealth
Voting over wealth redistribution is a neat setting where our model applies:
there are more poor individuals than rich, thus redistribution of wealth
yields greater harm to a single rich individual than benefit to a single poor
individual, thus complying with our setting of asymmetric individual bene-
fits.
There are m poor individuals whose wealth we normalize to 1 and n rich
individuals whose wealth we normalize to 2.15 Individuals are called to vote
between two extreme redistribution policies: no redistribution (alternative
N) and full redistribution (alternative M). Since the wealth of the poor is
less than the average wealth, a poor m individual would always prefer the
higher level of redistribution (alternative M) and, at the same time, a rich n
individual would always prefer the lower level (alternative N). As a reminder,
we assume that m > n > 1.
Under full redistribution each individual ends up with the average wealth
in the economy, which is:
2n+m
n+m
and under no redistribution everyone keeps her original wealth. Thus,
∆pim =
2n+m
n+m
− 1 = n
n+m
∆pin = 2− 2n+m
n+m
=
m
n+m
Notice that ∆pim =
n
m∆pin, as in our parametrization in Section 4.
The policy is decided by majority rule with ties being broken evenly, and
for simplicity the cost of voting is assumed to be identical for each individual
- that is, cm = cn = c > 0. This means that Bm =
c(n+m)
n and Bn =
c(n+m)
m .
The decision of the individuals is whether to cast a vote for their preferred
alternative and pay c, or to not vote at all. Thus, an individual of group i
may cast a vote if (3.1) is met: that is, if Am ≥ c(n+m)n for a poor individual,
15It will be clear that these wealth level assumptions are qualitatively without loss of
generality, since different wealth levels would just re-scale the results in the cost parameter
c.
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and An ≥ c(n+m)m for a rich individual. The individuals’ payoff is equal to
their final wealth minus, possibly, the cost of voting.
From Lemma 4 we know that the “Pure-Mix” p∗m = 0 and p∗n = 1−B
1
n−1
n
exist if and only if Bm > nBn − (n− 1)B
n
n−1
n . Therefore, if the “Pure-Mix”
still exists as c goes to 0 (equivalently, B goes to 0), then “High B” is the
unique equilibrium without any need for continuity, and the poor individuals
will never vote for any c > 0. Notice that the second term of the right-hand
side of Bm ≥ nBn − (n − 1)B
n
n−1
n goes to 0 faster than the other terms in
the inequality as B’s go to zero, and thus in the limit it is negligible. Then
sufficiently close to 0 we are left with only Bm > nBn. By plugging the
expressions for Bm and Bn we get:
m ≥ n2. (3.10)
This is a necessary and sufficient condition for p∗m = 0 to hold in the
unique equilibrium for any c > 0. Also, it has a nice interpretation. If the
society is sufficiently polarized (m < n2), the poor might vote and redis-
tribution has a chance of winning. However, in a sufficiently non-polarized
society (m ≥ n2), poors are doomed to lose the election.
How does a change of m affect (p∗m, p∗n)? We answer with the support of
Figure 3.5. We fix n = 3, and set m so as to initially have a polarized society
(m = 4, top-left), and gradually decrease the polarization (m = 5, top-right,
and m = 6, bottom-left), until we hit polarization m = n2 (m = 9, bottom-
right). When we hit this polarization threshold condition (3.10) is satisfied
and the “Mix-Mix 1” equilibrium (which survives continuity) disappears,
and we have only “High B” (“Pure-Mix” and “Pure-Pure”).
Consider n = 3 and m = 4. Since the society has (slightly) more poor
than rich individuals, the average wealth is closer to the wealth of a poor
individual than to the wealth of a rich individual, thus if full redistribution
wins, the individual loss of a single rich individual is greater than the indi-
vidual gain of a single poor individual. For this reason, an n rich individual
is willing to vote for greater B’s than an m poor individual. In other words,
a rich has more at stake than a poor, and thus is willing to face a greater
cost of voting. Therefore, p∗n turns positive for greater B’s than p∗m, as we
can see in Figure 3.5.
Consider an increase of m (n = 3 and m = 5, or 6). This has the effect of
sharpening the asymmetry in willingness to face the cost of voting between
rich and poor: in fact, now, p∗n turns positive for even greater B’s (the rich
has even more at stake to lose in case of full redistribution), while p∗m turns
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positive for even lower B’s (the poor has even less at stake to win in case of
full redistribution). This widens the “Pure-Mix” region (see Figure 3.5).
If the increase in m reaches the polarization threshold when m = n2
(n = 3 and m = 9), the poor has so little at stake that she is nowhere
willing to face the cost of voting with positive probability in equilibrium.16
A further increase in m would still imply p∗m = 0 everywhere, and further
increases the willingness to vote of the rich (i.e., p∗n increases for any given
B, and p∗n turns positive for greater B’s).
This could be read as a “poverty trap”: the greater is the share of poor
in a society, the less likely is redistribution of resources to be the outcome
of a democratic process (and if m ≥ n2 this probability is zero). Thus, the
poor might have an incentive to attempt non-democratic channels to exit
the policy trap.
16Remember that if m ≥ n2 the equilibrium is unique without the need for continuity
selection.
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Figure 3.5: Effects on voting probabilities of increasing m, keeping n = 3.
First row left panel m = 4, right panel m = 5. Second row, left panel m = 6
right panel m = 9.
3.5 Appendix A
We prove Proposition 6 by way of the following lemmata. See Figure 3.1.
Lemma 6. The only points satisfying (3.9) and (pm, pn) ∈ {0, 1}2 are:
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (p∗∗∗m , 1), with p∗∗∗m =
n(n−1)
n(n−1)+
√
n(n−1)(m−n)(m−n+1) .
Also, p∗∗∗m = 1 iff m = n .
Proof. By continuity of Am and An in pm and pn, in order to analyze the
behavior of Am and An in (pm, pn) ∈ {0, 1}2 we can compute the following
limits for Am
lim
pm→0
Am = npn(1− pn)n−1 + (1− pn)n
lim
pm→1
Am =

pnn + np
n−1
n (1− pn)(
m−1
n
)
pnn
0
if m = n
if m = n+ 1
if m > n+ 1
lim
pn→0
Am = (1− pm)m−1
lim
pn→1
Am =
(
m− 1
n− 1
)
pn−1m (1− pm)m−n +
(
m− 1
n
)
pnm(1− pm)m−n−1
and for An
lim
pm→0
An = (1− pn)n−1
lim
pm→1
An =
{
pn−1n
0
if m = n
if m > n
lim
pn→0
An = m(1− pm)m−1 + (1− pm)m
lim
pn→1
An =
(
m
n
)
pnm(1− pm)m−n +
(
m
n− 1
)
pn−1m (1− pm)m−n+1
From the above,
- if pm = 0, (3.9) holds iff pn = 0 or pn = 1
- if pm = 1, (3.9) holds iff pn = 0 or (see Appendix C) pn = 1 and
m = n
- if pn = 0, (3.9) holds iff pm = 0 or pm = 1
- if pn = 1, (3.9) is equivalent to(
m− 1
n− 1
)
pn−1m (1− pm)m−n +
(
m− 1
n
)
pnm(1− pm)m−n−1 =
(
m
n
)
pnm(1− pm)m−n +
(
m
n− 1
)
pn−1m (1− pm)m−n+1(
m− 1
n− 1
)
(1− pm) +
(
m− 1
n
)
pm =
(
m
n
)
pm(1− pm) +
(
m
n− 1
)
(1− pm)2 (3.11)
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If m = n, (3.11) boils down to
1− pm = pm(1− pm) +m (1− pm)2
whose unique solution is pm = 1.
If m > n, (3.11) boils down to
(1− pm)
m− n +
pm
n
=
mpm(1− pm)
n(m− n) +
m(1− pm)2
(m− n)(m− n+ 1)
Solving the simple polynomial in the last expression we see that p∗∗∗m is
indeed one of its two roots (the second root has to be discarded since it is
greater than 1).
Lemma 7. Equation pm + pn = 1 solves Am = An ∀(pm, pn) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Proof. From (3.2) plug Am and An into (3.9), simplify for (1−pm)m(1−pn)n,
and use pn = 1− pm to obtain
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
ps−sm (1−pm)−s−1+s+
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
ps−s−1m (1−pm)−s−1+s+1
=
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
ps−s−1m (1−pm)−s+s+
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
ps+1−s−1m (1−pm)−s−1+s
pm
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
+ (1− pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
= (1− pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
+ pm
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
pm
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
n− s
)
+ (1− pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
n− s− 1
)
= (1− pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
n− s− 1
)
+ pm
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
n− s− 1
)
pm
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
+(1−pm)
(
m+ n− 1
n− 1
)
= (1−pm)
(
m+ n− 1
n− 1
)
+pm
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
0 = 0
where in the second-to-last step we used the symmetry rule for binomial
coefficients, and in the last step we used Vandermonde’s identity.17
17Vandermonde’s identity states that
(
m+n
r
)
=
∑r
k=0
(
m
k
)(
n
r−k
)
for m,n, r ∈ N0.
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Next we characterize the set of points Am = An that are depicted by an
increasing line in the (pm, pn)-space by means of two lemmas. In Lemma 8
We show that there exists a point (p∗∗m , p∗∗n ) along the decreasing line which
divides the neighborhoods of the decreasing line into two parts:
1. The first part is the one connecting (p∗∗m , p∗∗n ) and (1, 0), where we
prove that increasing pm (i.e., moving to the right of the line), increases
Am more than An. Since exactly along the line Am = An, this result
implies that to the right of the segment connecting (p∗∗m , p∗∗n ) and (1, 0)
we have Am > An and to its left we have Am < An.
2. The second part is the one connecting (0, 1) and (p∗∗m , p∗∗n ), where we
prove that increasing pm (i.e., moving to the right of the line), increases
Am less than An. Since exactly along the line, Am = An, this result
implies that to the right of the segment connecting (0, 1) and (p∗∗m , p∗∗n )
we have that Am < An and to its left Am > An.
Lemma 8. ∃!(p∗∗m , p∗∗n ) ∈ (0, 1)2 with p∗∗m + p∗∗n = 1 such that
∂Am
∂pm
∣∣∣∣
pm+pn=1
>
∂An
∂pm
∣∣∣∣
pm+pn=1
iff pm > p
∗∗
m (or equivalently pn < p
∗∗
n )
Also, if m = n, then p∗∗m = p∗∗n =
1
2 , and if m > n, then p
∗∗
m ∈ (0, 12) and
p∗∗n ∈ (12 , 1).
In particular,
p∗∗m =
n(n− 1)
n(n− 1) +√m(m− 1)n(n− 1) and p∗∗n = 1− p∗∗m
Proof. For notation simplicity and for the sake of space we define the fol-
lowing
p˜s,m =
(
pm
1− pm
)s
p˜s,n =
(
pn
1− pn
)s
Then,
∂Am
∂pm
∣∣∣∣
pm+pn=1
>
∂An
∂pm
∣∣∣∣
pm+pn=1
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n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
s+ pm
pm(1− pm)2 +
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
s+ pm
pm(1− pm)2
pn
1− pn
∣∣∣∣∣
pm+pn=1
>
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
s
pm(1− pm)(1− pn) +
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
s+ 1
(1− pm)2(1− pn)
∣∣∣∣∣
pm+pn=1
by noticing that pm + pn = 1 implies p˜s,mp˜s,n = 1 the above inequality
simplifies to
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
s+ pm
pm(1− pm)2 +
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
s+ pm
p2m(1− pm)
>
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
s
p2m(1− pm)
+
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
s+ 1
pm(1− pm)2
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
pm(s+ pm) +
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
(1− pm)(s+ pm) >
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
(1− pm)s+
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
pm(s+ 1)
Note that some summands in the above inequality contain s only in
the binomial coefficients. By applying to these terms the same procedure
at the end of Lemma 7 (i.e. symmetry rule for binomial coefficients and
Vandermonde’s identity), we get
pm
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
s+p2m
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
+(1−pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
s+pm(1−pm)
(
m+ n− 1
n− 1
)
>
(1− pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
s+ pm
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
s+ pm
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
pm
n∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s
)
s+ (1− pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)(
n
s+ 1
)
s >
(1−pm)
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n− 1
s
)
s+pm
n−1∑
s=0
(
m
s+ 1
)(
n− 1
s
)
s+pm(1−pm)
[(
m+ n− 1
n
)
−
(
m+ n− 1
n− 1
)]
we now analyze the summations left (containing s not only in the bino-
mial coefficient), and use the fact that
∑n
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n
s
)
s = n
(
m+n−1
n
)
and that
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∑n
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n
s+1
)
s = m
(
m+n−1
n−2
)
,18 and get
npm
(
m+ n− 2
n
)
+ (m− 1)(1− pm)
(
m+ n− 2
n− 2
)
>
(n−1)(1−pm)
(
m+ n− 2
n− 1
)
+(n−1)pm
(
m+ n− 2
n
)
+pm(1−pm)
[(
m− n− 1
n
)
−
(
m− n− 1
n− 1
)]
(m− 1)(1− pm)
(
m+ n− 2
n− 2
)
>
(n−1)(1−pm)
(
m+ n− 2
n− 1
)
−pm
(
m+ n− 2
n
)
+pm(1−pm)
[(
m− n− 1
n
)
−
(
m− n− 1
n− 1
)]
and simplifying by (m+n−2)!(m−2)!(n−2)! we get
1− pm
m
>
1− pm
m− 1 −
pm
n(n− 1) + pm(1− pm)
(m− n)(m+ n− 1)
m(m− 1)n(n− 1)
−n(n− 1)(1− pm) > −m(m− 1)pm + pm(1− pm)(m− n)(m+ n− 1)
(m− n)(m+ n− 1)p2m + 2n(n− 1)pm − n(n− 1) > 0
pm >
n(n− 1)
n(n− 1) +√m(m− 1)n(n− 1) = p∗∗m
If m = n it is trivial to see that p∗∗m =
1
2 . But notice also that p
∗∗
m decreases
in m, and hence by m > n, p∗∗m ∈ (0, 12) and p∗∗n ∈ (12 , 1).
Lemma 9 concludes the characterization of the increasing line.
Lemma 9. There exists a unique and continuous line in the (pm, pn)-space
which satisfies Am = An and connects (0, 0) and (p
∗∗∗
m , 1) Furthermore, this
line crosses the pm + pn = 1 line once at (p
∗∗
m , p
∗∗
n ).
18
n∑
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n
s
)
s =
n∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
n!
s!(n− s)!s
=
n∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
n!
(s− 1)!(n− s)! =
n∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
n!
(s− 1)!(n− 1− s+ 1)!
=
n∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
(n− 1)!
(s− 1)!((n− 1)− (s− 1))!n = n
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
Where the last equality follows from Valdemore’s identity. The calculations for the
other summation are similar.
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Proof. Lemma 7 establishes that the decreasing line connects two out of the
four points satisfying Am = An along the edges. The line connecting the
remaining two points is continuous and by Lemma 8 crosses the decreasing
line once, at (p∗∗m , p∗∗n ).
3.6 Appendix B
The goal of this Appendix is to show that the two mixing conditions cross
at most once in each of the four regions delimited by the set of points such
that Am = An (see Figure 3.1). This implies that there are at most two
“Mix-Mix” equilibria.
In Figure 3.4 we depict these mixing conditions of both types of indi-
viduals for different B’s, and for m = 3 and n = 2. Note that i’s mixing
condition might cross the pm + pn = 1 line either twice, once or zero times.
If they cross twice, one crossing will be above and to the left of the point
(p∗∗m , p∗∗n ), and the other will be below and to the right of it. If they only
cross once the crossing coincides with point (p∗∗m , p∗∗n ). This is what we
prove in Proposition 7. Moreover, in Proposition 8 we show that the mix-
ing conditions of the n-individual are steeper (flatter) in all points satisfying
Am ≥ An (Am ≤ An). Thus the mixing conditions cross once in each of the
two regions of Figure 3.1 where Am > An (Am < An) for sufficiently low
B’s. This, together with the fact that continuity imposes pm+pn < 1 yields
the result.
Proposition 7. Define Bˆi = max
pm+pn=1
Ai. The number of intersections be-
tween pm + pn = 1 and i’s mixing condition Ai = Bi are:
1. two, if Bi < Bˆi. In particular, one with pm < p
∗∗
m and one with
pm > p
∗∗
m
2. one, if Bi = Bˆi. In particular, the one solving pm = p
∗∗
m and pn =
1− p∗∗m
3. zero, if Bi > Bˆi
∀i ∈ {m,n}.
Proof. Consider Figure 3.6. On the vertical axis there is Ai conditional on
being along the pm+pn = 1 line, and on the horizontal axis there is pm. We
are going to show that Ai conditional on being along pm+pn = 1 is increasing
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in pm if and only if pm < p
∗∗
m . Therefore there exists a Bˆi = max
pm+pn=1
Ai such
that the “Mix-Mix” condition Ai = Bi under pm + pn = 1 has two, one or
zero solutions according to whether Bi < Bˆi, Bi = Bˆi or Bi > Bˆi.
We use the same manipulations of Am and An used in the Proof of
Lemma 7, and hence (3.7) with pn = 1− pm reads
(1−pm)m−1pn−1m
[
pm
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
+ (1− pm)
(
m+ n− 1
n− 1
)]
= Bm (3.12)
and (3.8) with pn = 1− pm reads
(1− pm)m−1pn−1m
[
pm
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
+ (1− pm)
(
m+ n− 1
n− 1
)]
= Bn (3.13)
and notice that the left-hand sides are clearly identical by construction
because we know that along pm + pn = 1 line we have that Am = An (see
Lemma 7), whereas the right-hand sides could be unequal. We now analyze
the left-hand side, which can be rewritten as:(
m+ n− 1
n
)
(1− pm)m−1pn−1m
[
pm + (1− pm) n
m
]
or, equivalently,(
m+ n− 1
n
)
(1− pm)mpnm
[
1
1− pm +
n
mpm
]
which takes value 0 if pm ∈ {0, 1}. Also it increases in pm if and only if
pm < p
∗∗
m , because:
∂
∂pm
[(
m+ n− 1
n
)
(1− pm)mpnm
[
1
1− pm +
n
mpm
]]
> 0
∂
∂pm
[
m(1− pm)m−1pnm + n(1− pm)mpn−1m
]
> 0
m
[−(m− 1)(1− pm)m−2pnm + n(1− pm)m−1pn−1m ]+ n [−m(1− pm)m−1pn−1m + (n− 1)(1− pm)mpn−2m ] > 0
n(n− 1)(1− pm)2 −m(m− 1)p2m > 0
and the right-hand side of the last inequality has a unique root in pm ∈ (0, 1)
which coincides with p∗∗m .
Thus, consider different values of Bi’s which could satisfy (3.12) and
(3.13): if Bi < Bˆi then the mixing condition of i crosses the pm + pn = 1
line twice; if Bi > Bˆi it does not cross the pm + pn = 1 line; and if Bi = Bˆi
it crosses the pm + pn = 1 line exactly once in p
∗∗
m .
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Figure 3.6: Ai conditional on pm + pn = 1 as a function of pm, and its
crossings with Bi
Definition 3. We can express the mixing conditions as a function of pm as
follows: BRm : pm → pn and BRn : pm → pn respectively.
Note that they are both continuous by continuity of the “Mix-Mix” con-
ditions (3.7) and (3.8) in both pm and pn. Note furthermore that we defined
both BR’s as functions of pm into pn. We do this so we can compare their
slopes in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. For a given (pm, pn), Am ≥ An if and only if ∂BRn(pm)∂pm ≥
∂BRm(pm)
∂pm
.
Proof. We write condition (3.7) as Am(pm, BRm(pm)) = Bm. Note that we
have substituted into pn BRm(pm) and by the implicit function theorem we
get
∂BRm(pm)
∂pm
= −
∂Am(pm,BRm(pm))
∂pm
∂Am(pm,BRm(pm))
∂BRm(pm)
and similarly for individual n
∂BRn(pm)
∂pm
= −
∂An(pm,BRn(pm))
∂pm
∂An(pm,BRn(pm))
∂BRn(pm)
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Therefore ∂BRn(pm)∂pm ≥
∂BRm(pm)
∂pm
is equivalent to
∂Am(pm,BRm(pm))
∂pm
∂Am(pm,BRm(pm))
∂BRm(pm)
≥
∂An(pm,BRn(pm))
∂pm
∂An(pm,BRn(pm))
∂BRn(pm)
(3.14)
and using a similar notation as in the Proof of Lemma 8 for p˜s+1,m and
p˜s+1,n:
19
p˜s+1,m =
(
pm
1− pm
)s+1
p˜s+1,n =
(
pn
1− pn
)s+1
we get that (3.14) is equivalent to∑n−1
s=0
(
m
s+1
)(
n−1
s
)
p˜s+1,mp˜s,n
(
m− s+1pm
)
+
∑n−1
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n−1
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
(
m− spm
)
∑n−1
s=0
(
m
s+1
)(
n−1
s
)
p˜s+1,mp˜s,n
(
s
pn
− (n− 1)
)
+
∑n−1
s=0
(
m
s
)(
n−1
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
(
s
pn
− (n− 1)
) ≥
∑n−1
s=0
(
m−1
s
)(
n
s+1
)
p˜s,mp˜s+1,n
(
m− 1− spm
)
+
∑n
s=0
(
m−1
s
)(
n
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
(
m− 1− spm
)
∑n−1
s=0
(
m−1
s
)(
n
s+1
)
p˜s,mp˜s+1,n
(
s+1
pn
− n
)
+
∑n
s=0
(
m−1
s
)(
n
s
)
p˜s,mp˜s,n
(
s
pn
− n
)
(3.15)
It remains to be mathematically proven the fact that condition (3.15)
is equivalent to Am ≥ An, but is confirmed by Mathematica. The code is
available upon request.
3.7 Appendix C
This appendix will deal with the case of m = n. By the logic of QSNE it
is natural to assume that in equilibrium p∗m = p∗n = p∗. Therefore we will
have that Am = An.
First note that for Bi > 1, Bj > 1 Lemma 1 holds regardless of m and
n. The rest of the cases will be analyzed using a series of lemmas. Table 3.1
provides a summary of all the cases and corresponding lemmas (notice that
it is symmetric).
Lemma 10. For Bi = 1 and Bj = 1, there are only two equilibria: the
“Pure-Pure” (0, 0) and (1, 1) for all i, j ∈ {m,n} and i 6= j.
19For the sake of space we use pn instead of BRn(pm) and BRm(pm).
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Bi < 1 Bi = 1 Bi > 1
Bj < 1 Lemma 12
Bj = 1 Lemma 11 Lemma 9
Bj > 1 Lemma 10 Lemma 1
Table 3.1: Summary of Cases and Lemmas when m = n
Proof. When Bi = 1 then the only way for an individual i to vote with
positive probability is when Ai = 1 as well, meaning that individual i is
pivotal for sure.Thus he must know with certainty the number of individuals
i and j that will vote. But this can only happen if i and j individuals are
using pure strategies. Let pi = 1 and pj = 0. In this case, an individual i has
an incentive to deviate and not vote, so (1, 0) or (0, 1) cannot be equilibria.
However, if pi = 1 and pj = 1 then no-one has an incentive to deviate
because since Ai = Bi(= 1) an i individual would be indifferent between
voting or not, making (1, 1) an equilibrium. For the same reason (voters
being indifferent) we can also sustain pi = 0 and pj = 0. Since no-one is
voting, everybody is pivotal and Ai = Bi(= 1) still holds.
Lemma 11. For Bi ≤ 1 and Bj > 1, the unique equilibrium is p∗i = 0 and
p∗j = 0 if the equality (Bi = 1) holds and p
∗
i = 1 − B
1
i−1
i , p
∗
j = 0 when the
equality does not hold, for all i, j ∈ {m,n} and i 6= j.
Proof. By Lemma 1 p∗j = 0. If the equality (Bi = 1) holds, then the only
case for i to vote with positive probability is if Ai = Bi = 1. However since
no-one from j is voting, the only way to have Ai = 1 is by not voting at all.
Therefore the unique equilibrium is p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 0. If the equality does
not hold, the only case for i to vote with positive probability is if Ai ≥ Bi.
Then pi = 0 cannot be sustained in equilibrium because in this case Ai = 1,
and any i voter has an incentive to go and vote. Furthermore, pi = 1 cannot
support an equilibrium because any i individual would have an incentive to
deviate and not vote. Therefore the i individual must be mixing. Plugging
pj = 0 into the expression for Ai, we get: Ai = (1 − pi)i−1, so the mixing
condition becomes: Bi = (1 − pi)i−1. Solving for pi we get the equilibrium
probability of voting for i: p∗i = 1−B
1
i−1
i .
Lemma 12. For Bi < 1 and Bj = 1, p
∗
i = 1 and p
∗
j = 1 , for all i, j ∈ {m,n}
and i 6= j.
117
Proof. Since Bj = 1, an individual j votes only if Aj = 1, which cannot hap-
pen under mixed strategies. Then p∗i = 0, p
∗
j = 0 cannot be an equilibrium
because the i voters have incentive to vote since in this case Ai = 1 > Bi
due to the fact that all i voters are pivotal. However, p∗i = 1 and p
∗
j = 0 is
not an equilibrium either because then an i individual would prefer to not
vote, and by the same logic, p∗i = 0 and p
∗
j = 1 is not an equilibrium either.
Then the only remaining “Pure-Pure” case is: p∗i = 1 and p
∗
j = 1. This is
an equilibrium because under this we have: Ai > Bi and Aj = Bj = 1.
Lemma 13. Without loss of generality let Bi ≤ Bj < 1 for all i, j ∈ {m,n}
and i 6= j. Then there exists only one “Pure-Pure” QSNE p∗i = 1, p∗j = 1,
and at most two “Mix-Mix” equilibria.
Proof. For the first part, notice that neither p∗i = 0, p
∗
j = 1 nor p
∗
i = 1,
p∗j = 0 can be equilibria, since members of the voting group have an incentive
to not vote. For both of the other two candidate “Pure-Pure” equilibria
(p∗i = 0, p
∗
j = 0 and p
∗
i = 1, p
∗
j = 1) we have Aj = Ai = 1 > Bj ≥ Bi. This
means that p∗i = 0, p
∗
j = 0 cannot be an equilibrium because any individual
would have an incentive to deviate and vote, and that p∗i = 1, p
∗
j = 1 is
in fact an equilibrium because nobody has an incentive to deviate. For the
second part, since we need Ai = Bi and Aj = Bj , the result follows from
the analysis in Appendix B.
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